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PRIVATE GOVERNANCE RESPONSES TO CLIMATE 
CHANGE:  
THE CASE OF GLOBAL CIVIL AVIATION 
Michael P. Vandenbergh* & Daniel J. Metzger* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article explores how private governance can reduce the climate 
effects of global civil aviation. The civil aviation sector is a major 
contributor to climate change, accounting for emissions comparable to 
a top ten emitting country. National and international governmental 
bodies have taken important steps to address civil aviation, but the 
measures adopted to date are widely acknowledged to be inadequate. 
Civil aviation poses particularly difficult challenges for government 
climate mitigation efforts. Many civil aviation firms operate globally, 
emissions often occur outside of national boundaries, nations differ on 
their respective responsibilities, and demand is growing rapidly. 
Although promising new technologies are emerging, they will take 
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time to develop and adopt. This Article argues that private initiatives 
can overcome many of these barriers. Private initiatives can motivate 
civil aviation firms to act absent government pressure at the national 
level and can create pressure for mitigation that transcends national 
boundaries. The Article argues that it is time to develop a private 
climate governance agenda for civil aviation and identifies examples 
of the types of existing and new initiatives that could be included in 
the effort. If public and private policymakers can overcome the 
tendency to focus almost exclusively on public governance, private 
initiatives can yield large and prompt emissions reductions from global 
civil aviation, buy time for more comprehensive government 
measures, and complement the government measures when they occur. 
INTRODUCTION 
Fuel use accounts for roughly a third of an airline’s operating costs, 
so it is fair to assume that airlines are motivated to achieve high levels 
of fuel efficiency.1 Yet it was not until Virgin Atlantic Airlines began 
studying its carbon footprint with the help of a non-profit group and 
several University of Chicago economists that its managers realized 
how simply providing fuel use information to pilots could reduce fuel 
use and carbon emissions while saving large amounts of money.2 What 
motivated Virgin Atlantic to act after overlooking this major cost 
savings for decades? Although Virgin Atlantic may have been 
anticipating government regulatory limits on aircraft carbon emissions 
in the distant future, it was also subject to pressure for carbon 
emissions reductions from advocacy groups, investors pushing for 
disclosure of carbon emissions, and the public climate statements of 
its founder, Sir Richard Branson.3 
                                                                 
 1. Greer K. Gosnell et al., A New Approach to an Age-Old Problem: Solving 
Externalities by Incenting Workers Directly 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 22316, 2016) (2–3%), https://www.nber.org/papers/w22316 
[https://perma.cc/X647-2VES] (“[F]uel use in the industry affects profits—fuel 
represents an average 33% of [airlines’] operating costs”). 
 2. See id. 
 3. Fiona Harvey, Richard Branson leads call to free global economy from 
carbon emissions, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 5, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2015/feb/05/richard-branson-net-zero-emissions-target-businesses 
[https://perma.cc/M7UN-L4KC]. For example, in 2015 Branson was quoted saying 
that “[s]etting a net-zero GHG emissions target by 2050 will drive innovation, grow 
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This symposium focuses on the growing importance of private 
environmental governance.4 In recent years, private governance 
initiatives have begun to focus on climate change,5 and in this Article 
we explore how private initiatives can address the carbon emissions of 
civil aviation firms such as Virgin Atlantic.6 Civil aviation is a 
significant contributor to climate change. The sector accounts for 
roughly two percent of global greenhouse gas emissions, an amount 
comparable to one of the highest-emitting nations, and its contribution 
is expected to grow. Although existing and new technologies can 
reduce the sector’s emissions, a number of barriers prevent rapid 
uptake of these technologies.7 In addition, government measures face 
substantial barriers.8 Much of civil aviation is international, which 
leaves national and subnational governments ill-suited to reduce its 
effects. Intergovernmental organizations are attempting to respond, 
but these organizations face collective action problems and have 
limited capacity to enforce environmental standards against non-
compliant actors. Their efforts have resulted in the Carbon Offsetting 
and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA), which is 
an important achievement for the international process. The goal of 
                                                                 
jobs, build prosperity and secure a better world for what will soon be 9 billion people. 
Why would we wait any longer to do that?” Id. at 2. 
 4. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 
CORNELL L. REV. 129, 146 (2013) (defining private environmental governance as 
“actions taken by non-governmental entities that are designed to achieve traditionally 
governmental ends such as managing the exploitation of common pool resources, 
increasing the provisions of public goods, reducing environmental externalities, or 
more justly distributing environmental amenities.”); Sarah E. Light & Eric W. Orts, 
Parallels in Public and Private Environmental Governance, 5 MICH. J. ENVTL. & 
ADMIN. L. 1, 3 (2015) (defining private environmental governance as “the 
traditionally ‘governmental’ functions of environmental standard setting and 
enforcement that private actors, including business firms and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), adopt to address environmental concerns.”). 
 5. See MICHAEL P. VANDENBERGH & JONATHAN M. GILLIGAN, BEYOND 
POLITICS: THE PRIVATE GOVERNANCE RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE (2017). 
 6. In this Article, we refer to the carbon emissions from civil aviation as a 
shorthand way to refer to not only the greenhouse gas emissions attributable to the 
civil aviation sector, but also the other ways in which the sector contributes to 
increases in global average temperature, such as through the creation of contrails. 
See discussion infra Part I.B. The Effect of Climate Change on Civil Aviation. 
 7. See infra Part II.A. Challenges to International Public Governance. 
 8. See infra Part II.B. International Initiatives. 
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CORSIA, however, is modest: to freeze net emissions at 2020 levels, 
largely through the use of carbon offsets. 
Private environmental governance initiatives—non-governmental 
actions that pursue traditionally governmental objectives like 
managing consumption of common resources, increasing public 
goods, and reducing negative externalities—often use private forms of 
common governmental instruments (e.g., information disclosure 
requirements, performance requirements, carbon taxes, and others)9 
and are tackling many of the same subject matter areas as government 
environmental regulatory programs.10 These private initiatives can 
play an important role in reducing civil aviation’s carbon emissions, 
buying time for more substantial efforts to become politically viable 
and complementing government regulatory efforts when they do. 
Rather than depending on the coercive power or resources of any 
nation, group of nations, or subnational government, private initiatives 
can harness the support for climate mitigation among investors, 
lenders, retail and corporate customers, employees, managers, and 
others.11 As the Virgin Atlantic experience suggests, private actors can 
motivate civil aviation firms to act and provide the expertise necessary 
for firms to do so in an effective way. These efforts are often facilitated 
by organizational self-interest, since many climate mitigation 
initiatives will not only respond to demands from stakeholders, but 
also will yield lower energy and other costs. Maximizing fuel 
efficiency, for example, is often in an airline’s self-interest. Of course, 
unobserved costs may be a barrier,12 and the motivations of 
corporations and other private sector organizations are complex, but 
the literature on private ordering provides reason for optimism. 
Greenwashing—a false claim of pro-environmental action—is a risk, 
but private initiatives that target civil aviation’s carbon emissions also 
                                                                 
 9. See Light & Orts, supra note 4, at 23–52 (noting parallel instruments). 
 10. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 4, at 146; see 
also Sarah E. Light & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 
in ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION MAKING, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
(Robert Glicksman & LeRoy Paddock eds., 2016) (noting parallel instruments and 
subject matters). 
 11. See Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jonathan Gilligan, Beyond Gridlock, 41 
COLUM. J. ENVTL L. 217 (2015). 
 12. See Gosnell et al., supra note 1, at 1; Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Drivers 
of Corporate Climate Mitigation, ENVTL. F. 29 (Jan.–Feb. 2018), at 29. 
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can exceed expectations and can have positive spillover effects on 
government programs, building support for and reducing the cost of 
public governance.13 
Part I provides context about the climate effects of civil aviation by 
describing the sector’s current contributions to climate forcing, 
expected growth, and the options for reducing those contributions. Part 
II analyzes challenges that stand in the way of government civil 
aviation climate efforts and describes existing government efforts. Part 
III explains why private governance initiatives can bypass some of the 
obstacles that discourage government action, suggests development of 
a private climate governance agenda for civil aviation, and provides 
examples of specific private initiatives that can reduce the sector’s 
carbon emissions. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Contributions of Civil Aviation to Climate Change 
Following guidance from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), the Environmental Protection Agency distinguishes 
between civil, military, and general aviation.14 Civil aviation includes 
“[e]missions from international and domestic civil aviation, including 
take-offs and landings . . . [and c]omprises civil commercial use of 
airplanes, including: scheduled and charter traffic for passengers and 
freight, air taxiing, and general aviation,” military aviation is 
comprised of all aircraft under control of the armed forces, and general 
aviation refers to recreational and small corporate aircraft.15 In 2015, 
civil aviation accounted for 119 out of a national total of 157.7 million 
                                                                 
 13. For a discussion of an example of private governance initiative that exceeded 
expectations, see discussion infra at note 189 (discussing Walmart’s reduction of 28 
million tons of carbon emissions following a commitment to achieve 20 million 
tons). 
 14. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE 
GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990–2015 3–94 (2017), https://www.epa.gov/sites/
production/files/2017-02/documents/2017_complete_report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PFY4-BWRG] [hereinafter U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORY]. 
 15. See IPCC, 2006 IPCC GUIDELINES FOR NATIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS 
INVENTORIES (Vol.1 at 8.12) (2006), https://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/
2006gl/pdf/1_Volume1/V1_8_Ch8_Reporting_Guidance.pdf; see also id. 
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tons of jet fuel consumed in the United States.16 During the same year 
military aircraft consumed 14.7 million tons of jet fuel and general 
aviation used roughly 24 million tons.17 
In this Article we focus on global civil aviation, and we focus in 
particular on passenger travel rather than freight transport in our 
discussion of private initiatives in Part III.18 Civil aviation as a whole 
plays a critical role in the global economy. On a global basis, three and 
a half billion passengers travelled across a distance of nearly four 
trillion miles in 2015.19 Sixty percent of these passengers flew 
internationally.20 The fleet that transports these passengers is made up 
of over twenty-six thousand aircraft operated by more than one 
thousand commercial airlines.21 The availability of rapid, reliable air 
transport facilitates economic activity worldwide and is supported by 
nearly four thousand airports serving commercial flights.22 Although 
industry groups rightly point out that civil aviation is “essential for 
global business” and that it “plays a vital role in facilitating economic 
growth, particularly in developing countries,” the industry also 
acknowledges its significant and complex contribution to climate 
change.23 
In 2015, civil aviation worldwide emitted around 781 million tons 
of carbon dioxide, representing about 2% of all human carbon dioxide 
emissions.24 As we mentioned at the outset, if civil aviation were a 
                                                                 
 16. U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORY, supra note 14, at 3–24. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text. Although civil aviation is not 
responsible for all aircraft emissions, it represents the most significant component of 
the aviation total. Later in this Article we discuss options that can reduce carbon 
emissions from aircraft themselves as well as from ground infrastructure, and we use 
the term civil aviation to refer to both portions of the sector together. Where this 
Article discusses carbon mitigation options that are available only to firms that 
transport freight and passengers by aircraft, we refer to those firms as airlines, as 
opposed to, for example, ground services or renewable fuel manufacturing firms. 
 19. AIR TRANSPORT ACTION GROUP (ATAG), AVIATION: BENEFITS BEYOND 
BORDERS 5 (2016) [hereinafter AVIATION: BENEFITS BEYOND BORDERS]. 
 20. Id. at 5. 
 21. Id. at 6. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 5, 7. 
 24. Id. at 7. Estimates of aviation’s total global emissions vary, but are typically 
in the range of 1.5 to 3%. See, e.g., Janina D. Scheelhaase & Wolfgang G. Grimme, 
Emissions Trading for International Aviation—An Estimation of the Economic 
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nation, it would be a top-ten carbon dioxide emitter, roughly equal to 
all of Germany’s carbon emissions from fuel combustion.25 Within the 
European Union, civil aviation emissions constitute 3% of greenhouse 
gas emissions.26 In 2013, civil aviation wholly within, or originating 
within in the United States comprised 29% of global civil aviation 
emissions and 3% of the country’s total greenhouse gas emissions.27 
Although three percent may seem like a small percentage, the climate 
problem is caused by many types of sources, most of which can claim 
to be small contributors on their own, yet achieving carbon mitigation 
targets will require emissions reductions from many of these sources.28 
Mitigating carbon emissions is particularly important because even 
though a significant portion of the emissions from civil aviation are 
absorbed into the ocean and taken up by plants,29 the carbon that 
                                                                 
Impact on Selected European Airlines, 13 J. AIR TRANSP. MGMT. 253 (2007) 
(“[B]etween 2.5 and 3%.”); ROB BAILIS, DERIK BROEKHOFF & CARRIE M. LEE, 
STOCKHOLM ENVTL. INST., SUPPLY AND SUSTAINABILITY OF CARBON OFFSETS AND 
ALTERNATIVE FUELS FOR INTERNATIONAL AVIATION 1 (2016) (“International 
aviation produced . . . in 2013, about 1.5% of global CO2 emissions from fossil fuel 
combustion . . . .”); Gosnell et al., supra note 1, at 1. 
 25. Each Country’s Share of CO2 Emissions, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS 
(Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.ucsusa.org/global-warming/science-and-impacts/
science/each-countrys-share-of-co2.html#.WO4o24jyuUk [https://perma.cc/EA9X-
ECVQ]; AVIATION: BENEFITS BEYOND BORDERS, supra note 19. These figures 
compare carbon dioxide emitted by civil aviation with national totals for fuel 
consumption. See infra Appendix A, p. 97.  
 26. STEVAN TRUXAL, ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL AVIATION 126 (2017). The European Environmental Agency 
reported that civil aviation in the European Union in 2014 emitted 15,379 kilotons 
of carbon dioxide. EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCY, ANNUAL EUROPEAN 
UNION GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORY 1990–2014 AND INVENTORY REPORT 2016 at 
xi (2016), http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/annual-european-union-
greenhouse-gas/at_download/file [https://perma.cc/KAH2-QBXW]. 
 27. Reducing Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Aircraft, CENTER FOR CLIMATE 
AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS, https://www.c2es.org/content/reducing-carbon-dioxide-
emissions-from-aircraft/ [http://perma.cc/7TZH-3FU3] (last visited July 10, 2018). 
 28. See, e.g., Kevin M. Stack & Michael P. Vandenbergh, The One Percent 
Problem, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1385, 1388 (2011) (examining how climate change’s 
global scale renders most individual sources small percentages of the whole; 
accordingly, climate mitigation efforts will need to address many individually-minor 
contributors). 
 29. David W. Fahey & David S. Lee, Aviation and Climate Change: A Scientific 
Perspective, 10 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 97, 98 (2016). 
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remains in the atmosphere can linger for thousands of years.30 Further, 
these emissions are not limited to carbon dioxide. High temperature 
combustion in jet engines creates nitric oxide and nitrogen dioxide, 
primarily at cruising altitude.31 In the presence of sunlight, these 
nitrogen compounds react in ways that increase atmospheric ozone but 
decrease the presence of methane.32 Less methane results in less 
warming, but the increase in ozone outweighs this benefit, resulting in 
a net warming effect.33 Aviation injects sulfur compounds into the 
atmosphere as well, since sulfur is typically present in aviation fuels at 
around 400–600ppm.34 Further, aviation emissions are distinctive 
relative to the same compounds emitted from other industries. Unlike 
nearly every other anthropogenic source of carbon, most aviation 
emissions are emitted directly into the atmosphere high above the 
earth’s surface.35 Aviation emissions are more damaging than they 
would be at sea level because nitrogen compounds are converted to 
ozone more efficiently at high altitudes, and because aircraft produce 
contrails.36 
Contrails are formed when warm water vapor in a jet’s plume of 
exhaust is emitted into cold, moist air.37 As the exhaust expands and 
cools, water droplets condense and freeze.38 If the surrounding 
                                                                 
 30. Id. It should be noted however, that carbon dioxide absorbed into the oceans 
increases their acidity, which has a significant effect on marine ecosystems 
worldwide. 
 31. See id. (“[H]igh temperatures of combustion lead to the formation and 
emission of nitrogen species.”); U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORY, supra note 14, 
at 3–94 (“In jet engines, N2O is primarily produced by the oxidation of atmospheric 
nitrogen, and the majority of emissions occur during the cruise phase.”). 
 32. Fahey & Lee, supra note 30, at 98 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. David S. Lee et al., Aviation and Global Climate Change in the 21st Century, 
43 ATMOSPHERIC ENV’T 3520 (2009) (“[T]he largest fraction of [aviation’s] 
emissions are injected at aircraft cruise altitudes of 8–12 km. At these altitudes, the 
emissions have increased effectiveness to cause chemical and aerosol effects relevant 
to climate forcing.”). 
 36. See David S. Lee, Aviation and Climate Change: The Science, in CLIMATE 
CHANGE AND AVIATION: ISSUES, CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS 27, 41 (Stefan 
Gössling & Paul Upham eds., 2009). 
 37. Fahey & Lee, supra note 30, at 100. 
 38. Id. 
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atmosphere is dry, contrails dissipate quickly.39 But in conditions with 
enough ambient atmospheric water vapor, background water can 
condense onto those frozen droplets, resulting in persistent linear 
clouds that are formed behind each of an aircraft’s jet engines.40 These 
clouds can persist for hours after formation, eventually blending with 
existing clouds.41 High-level clouds like these have both cooling and 
warming effects: They reflect incoming solar radiation and trap 
escaping terrestrial radiation, but their effect on the latter is larger over 
the long term.42 Consequently, increasing contrail-based clouds 
increases the heat that is trapped in the atmosphere.43 In fact, a 1999 
special report on civil aviation and climate change by the IPCC noted 
that aviation’s role in cloud formation may have a climate changing 
effect comparable to all of the industry’s carbon emissions.44 More 
recent work has supported the assessment that contrails are a 
significant component of civil aviation’s climate impact,45 and under 
current projections radiative forcing from contrail-induced cloudiness 
could increase seven-fold by 2050.46 
The attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 gave 
scientists an opportunity to shed further light on the effect of civil 
aviation on climate by allowing them to examine the effect of almost 
                                                                 
 39. Hermann Mannstein & Ulrich Schumann, Aircraft Induced Contrail Cirrus 
Over Europe, 14 METEOROLOGISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT 549 (2005). 
 40. Victoria Williams et al., Reducing the Climate Change Impacts of Aviation 
by Restricting Cruise Altitudes, 7 TRANSP. RES. PART D 451 (2002). 
 41. Fahey & Lee, supra note 30, at 100. 
 42. Williams et al., supra note 41, at 451. 
 43. Id. 
 44. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, AVIATION AND THE 
GLOBAL ATMOSPHERE: SUMMARY FOR POLICY MAKERS 7 (1999) (showing nearly 
equal radiative forcing changes derived carbon dioxide emissions and contrail 
formation). 
 45. Fahey & Lee, supra note 30, at 101 (concluding, based on data from 2005, 
that of all of aviation’s radiative forcing impacts, increased total cloudiness is the 
most significant); see also Bo Zou et al., Optimal 4-D Aircraft Trajectories in a 
Contrail-Sensitive Environment, 16 NETWORKS & SPATIAL ECON. 415 (2016) 
(“While a number of studies have examined the climate impact of persistent contrails 
with varying estimated results, the general conclusion is that the magnitude of 
contrail climate impact is non-negligible comparable to that of CO2.”). 
 46. Chih-Chieh Chen & Andrew Gettelman, Simulated 2015 Aviation Radiative 
Forcing from Contrails and Aerosols, 16 ATMOSPHERIC CHEMISTRY & PHYSICS 
7317 (2016). 
2018] THE CASE OF GLOBAL CIVIL AVIATION 71 
 
entirely halting civil aviation for several days. United States airports 
handled 38,047 flights on September 10; on the twelfth, 252.47 
Commercial aircraft were grounded for three days following the 
attack.48 Early research into the effect of that grounding suggested that 
the absence of contrails had a predictable influence—because these 
clouds block some incoming solar radiation in the short term but 
prevent some energy from escaping over the long term, removing 
contrails can be expected to increase temperature in the near term.49 
Not surprisingly, during the grounding period daily temperature ranges 
across the United States increased by about 1.1°C above historic 
averages.50 Although subsequent research has pointed out that the 
specific effects observed during those three days were also explainable 
by natural variation and other weather factors,51 the changes observed 
during that period suggest that even though contrails are not the sole 
driver of cloud-induced temperature changes, they may play an 
important role.52 
                                                                 
 47. THE IMPACT OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 ON AVIATION, INTERNATIONAL AIR 
TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION 2 (2011), http://www.iata.org/pressroom/Documents/
impact-9-11-aviation.pdf. 
 48. David Travis et al., Contrails Reduce Daily Temperature Range 418 NATURE 
601 (2002). 
 49. Air-traffic moratorium opened window on contrails and climate (August 8, 
2002) NATURE.COM, http://www.nature.com/news/2002/020808/full/news020805-
7.html [https://perma.cc/J66F-A5M7]. 
 50. Travis et al., supra note 49. 
 51. See Gang Hong et al., Do Contrails Significantly Reduce Daily Temperature 
Range? 35 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS (“While missing contrails may have 
affected the DTR, their impact is probably too small to detect with a statistical 
significance.”). But cf. Simone Dietmüller et al., Contrails, Natural Clouds, and 
Diurnal Temperature Range 21 J. CLIMATE 5061 (2008) (“Although a radiative 
cooling of contrails during the day and a warming during the night is reproduced by 
the climate model simulation with enhanced contrails, we could not find any 
significant decrease in DTR in the multiyear simulations including contrails, even 
when enhancing the contrail effect to level much higher than expected . . . .”). 
 52. David Travis, the author of one of the earliest studies on climate effects of 
the September 11 groundings has pointed out that subsequent studies do not disprove 
this core understanding of how contrails effect climate. The Hong et al. study, for 
example, studied the effect of high-level cloudiness in general, and did not separate 
out contrails specifically. See Anna Barnett, Can aircraft trails affect climate?, (Dec. 
31, 2008) NATURE, http://www.nature.com/news/2008/081231/full/news.2008.
1335.html [https://perma.cc/YR6Y-23XA] (discussing Hong et al., supra note 52). 
In addition, although longer-term studies show that variations as significant as what 
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In addition, although estimates vary, the consensus is that civil 
aviation will continue to grow rapidly. In its 2016–2035 Market 
Outlook, Boeing forecast that airline traffic will increase 4.8% by 
2033, and that long-term demand will call for 39,620 new airplanes.53 
The Federal Aviation Administration forecast that the U.S. 
commercial fleet will grow at 1% annually, adding over 1,500 new 
aircrafts by 2036.54 Rapid growth in the number of passengers and the 
size of commercial fleets corresponds to large projected increases in 
emissions. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 
reported in 2009 that by 2050 global civil aviation will consume 880 
MT of jet fuel.55 Thus under a business-as-usual scenario, 2050 
emissions could be triple what they are today.56 
B. The Effect of Climate Change on Civil Aviation 
In the previous section we examined several ways in which aviation 
contributes to climate change. But the relationship between aviation 
and climate change is further complicated by the ways in which 
climate change will affect aviation. Climate change will alter the civil 
aviation industry in many ways, but risks to airports and changes in 
aircraft performance are among the most salient.57 
                                                                 
Travis et al. observed can occur through natural processes, those variations are 
extraordinarily rare and unlikely to account for the 2001 observations. Id. 
 53. BOEING, CURRENT MARKET OUTLOOK 2016–2035 2 (2016), http://www.
boeing.com/resources/boeingdotcom/commercial/about-our-market/assets/
downloads/cmo_print_2016_final_updated.pdf. 
 54. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMIN., FAA AEROSPACE FORECAST: FISCAL YEARS 
2016–2036 28 (2016), https://www.faa.gov/data_research/aviation/aerospace_
forecasts/media/FY2016-36_FAA_Aerospace_Forecast.pdf. 
 55. Int’l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], Global Aviation CO2 Emissions Projections 
to 2050, ICAO Doc. GIACC/4-IP/1 (May 20, 2009), http://www.icao.int/
environmental-protection/GIACC/Giacc-4/Giacc4_ip01_en.pdf. 
 56. Parth Vaishnav, ICAO’s Market Based Mechanism: Keep it Simple, 10 
CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 120, 120 (2016) (“If the impact of alternative fuels is 
not accounted for, CO2 emissions from aviation are likely to grow by between 40% 
and 300% between now and 2050.”). 
 57. For a systematic overview of the distinct ways in which different sectors of 
aviation industry will be affected, see Terence R. Thompson, Climate Change 
Impacts Upon the Commercial Air Transport Industry: An Overview, 10 CARBON & 
CLIMATE L. REV. 105 (2016). 
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Sea-level rise and increased storm frequency threaten low-lying 
airports by adding to the risk that storm events will cause airports to 
be modified, shut down, or relocated. A quarter of the largest airports 
in the United States are already vulnerable to moderate to high storm 
surge.58 At least thirty European airports are similarly vulnerable, and 
many more airports worldwide may be as well.59 Increased average 
temperatures also increase the fire hazard of stored aviation fuel, which 
has a flash point of about 100°F.60 A comprehensive assessment of 
climate risks at London’s Heathrow Airport determined that 
temperatures exceeding aviation fuel’s flashpoint pose a significant 
risk in 2020–2050.61 
Climate change will also have major effects on flight performance. 
For example, as air temperature increases it becomes less dense, 
causing a wing traveling through it to generate less lift than it would 
in cooler, denser air.62 As a result, takeoff speeds must be increased.63 
Since airport runway lengths vary, aircraft will not always be able to 
achieve the speed necessary to take off at their maximum weight.64 
These disruptions can also occur even when flights are not cancelled; 
for example, on a 92°F day at Ronald Reagan Washington National 
Airport, a Boeing 737-800 will have to reduce its weight to 15,000 
pounds below maximum to take off.65 For a cross-country flight this 
weight restriction represents a thirty percent reduction in payload 
capacity66—and based on FAA guidelines for average passenger 
                                                                 
 58. Id. at 107 (“[I]n the United States more than 25% of the largest airports have 
at least one runway with an elevation within the reach of moderate to high storm 
surge. Sea level rise will pose a threat to low-lying infrastructure . . . .”) (citations 
omitted). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 108–09. 
 61. HEATHROW AIRPORT, CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION REPORTING POWER 
REPORT 88 (2011), http://www.heathrow.com/file_source/Company/Static/PDF/
Communityandenvironment/LHR-climate-change-adaptation-report.pdf. 
 62. See E. Coffle & R. Horton, Climate Change and the Impact of Extreme 
Temperatures on Aviation, 7 WEATHER, CLIMATE & SOC’Y 94, 94 (2015). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 95. 
 66. Id. at 97. 
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weight, this could mean seventy-nine fewer passengers.67 2017 saw 
extreme heat forcing airlines to cancel some flights entirely in the 
United States.68 As climate change increases the number of very hot 
days each summer, weight restrictions will become more common, 
severe, and disruptive. 
In addition, flight times and turbulence are expected to increase. A 
2016 study examining flights between New York and London 
concluded that as carbon dioxide in the atmosphere increases, average 
flight times increase.69 Although changes in the jet stream will make 
eastbound flights shorter, they will lengthen westbound flights at a 
greater rate, thus increasing the average time and fuel consumed on 
each trip.70 A similar phenomenon has been observed in average flight 
times across the Pacific, where changes in wind speeds widen the time 
difference between inbound and outbound flights asymmetrically, 
netting more flying time and more fuel consumed.71 The intensity of 
turbulence along the same flight path is expected to increase by ten to 
                                                                 
 67. The FAA estimates that the summer weight of an adult passenger, including 
their carry-on baggage and personal items, is 190lbs—accounting for bulkier winter 
clothing, winter passengers average 195lbs. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., AIRCRAFT 
WEIGHT AND BALANCE CONTROL, AC 120-27E tbl. 2-1 (June 10, 2005). 
https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC120-27E.pdf. 
 68. Zach Wichter, Too Hot to Fly? Climate Change May Take a Toll on Air 
Travel, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/20/business/
flying-climate-change.html [https://perma.cc/24TR-H4VB]. 
 69. Paul D. Williams, Transatlantic Flight Times and Climate Change, 11 
ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 024008 (2016). 
 70. Id.; see also Soo Kim, Climate change ‘to increase turbulence, flight times 
and fares’, TELEGRAPH (May 12, 2016), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/news/
climate-change-to-increase-turbulence-flight-times-and-costs/ 
[https://perma.cc/6KU7-QCGN] (reporting that Williams’ key finding was that 
“aircraft on transatlantic routes were collectively projected to ‘be airborne for an 
extra 2,000 hours a year, burning an extra 7.2 million gallons of jet fuel’ and emit an 
‘extra 70 million kilograms of carbon dioxide.’”). 
 71. Kristopher B. Karnauskas et al., Coupling Between Air Travel and Climate, 
5 NAT. CLIMATE CHANGE 1068, 1069 (2015) (“Although the relationship between 
westbound and eastbound flight times is inverse and strong, a closer look at the total 
round-trip flying time by route . . . reveals a small but significant round-trip 
residual.”); see also Justin Worland, How Climate Change Could Make Your Flights 
Longer, TIME (Jul. 14, 2015), http://time.com/3957203/climate-change-flight-time/ 
[https://perma.cc/AC8E-P5V6] (“Flights over the Pacific Ocean have gotten longer 
due to climate change-related changes in wind patterns, a shift that could be mirrored 
in other regions across the globe . . . .”). 
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forty percent by the middle of the century, and its frequency could 
increase by 40–170%.72 
C. Pathways to Reducing the Climate Effects of Aviation 
Although civil aviation currently generates contrails and substantial 
emissions, a range of measures can mitigate its effects. Most of these 
measures are designed to reduce fuel consumption and thereby reduce 
the emissions that are produced when aviation fuels are used. Because 
fuel accounts for about a third of an airline’s operating cost, civil 
aviation firms already have incentives to operate efficiently, but a 
range of market, organizational, and behavioral barriers may exist.73 
The result, as suggested by the Virgin Atlantic example, is that a 
surprisingly large gap exists between the current state of the industry 
and full realization of all cost-effective efficiency measures.74 
In this Section I.C we describe several possible actions that could 
reduce civil aviation’s contribution to climate change, regardless of 
whether the actor driving the action is public or private. The purpose 
of this description is not to calculate the specific extent of each 
opportunity,75 but rather to highlight the types of opportunities that 
exist and demonstrate that fully adopting them would yield a 
meaningful reduction in emissions. We then turn to the actors who 
could induce the civil aviation sector to seize these opportunities. We 
                                                                 
 72. Paul D. Williams & Manoj M. Joshi, Intensification of Winter Transatlantic 
Aviation Turbulence in Response to Climate Change, 3 NAT. CLIMATE CHANGE 644, 
646 (2013). 
 73. Vaishnav, supra note 57, at 121; See also Gosnell et al., supra note 1, at 1. 
 74. See, e.g., infra, Subsection. III.B.2. (describing a Virgin Atlantic study on 
pilot behaviors that have an effect on how much fuel is consumed on a given flight). 
 75. Some of the measures that we describe in this section overlap in technically 
complex ways which are beyond the scope of this Article. For example, lower 
cruising altitudes have been suggested as a way to reduce contrail formation. But 
operating at a lower altitude forces aircraft to travel through a denser portion of the 
atmosphere, expend more energy doing so, and therefore consume more fuel to 
obtain that energy. Similarly, travelling north–south at sunrise and sunset can reduce 
contrail formation, but in many cases would also increase a flight’s total distance. 
See Judith Rosenow, Optical Properties of Condensation Trails (Oct. 6, 2016) 
(unpublished Dr.-Ing. dissertation, Technische Universität Dresden), https://www.
researchgate.net/profile/Judith_Rosenow/publication/309464261_Optical_
Properties_of_Condensation_Trails/links/5811cdd108aec29d99f779fb/Optical-
Properties-of-Condensation-Trails.pdf. 
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discuss public governance responses in Part II and private governance 
responses in Part III. 
1. Efficient Operations 
Increasing the efficiency of operational measures is one of the most 
promising avenues through which civil aviation emissions can be 
reduced. Operational measures generally work within existing 
infrastructure and design constraints, and some can be adopted very 
quickly. The Virgin Atlantic study examined the role that pilot 
incentives can play on fuel use during flights, finding that pilots have 
significant control over how efficiently they operate and that they can 
be incentivized to do so.76 In the study, researchers observed the 
behaviors of 335 Virgin Atlantic captains with regard to three behavior 
modifications through which the pilots could influence fuel 
efficiency.77 
The researchers first examined pre-flight decisions about how much 
fuel an aircraft would carry on its route.78 Prior to each flight, pilots 
use their professional judgment to adjust the amount of fuel that the 
aircraft will ultimately carry, based on the final weight of the aircraft.79 
This allows the pilot to prevent excess fuel from being loaded onto the 
aircraft, thereby reducing the flight’s overall weight, and the energy 
necessary to transport it to its destination.80 The study next measured 
whether pilots are making fuel efficient choices during flight, 
including obtaining optimum altitudes and any feasible shortcuts from 
air traffic control, adjusting speed, responding optimally to changing 
weather, and making efficient choices about flap settings and landing 
gear. Finally, pilots have control over whether to shut down one or 
more engines during taxiing, thereby further reducing a flight’s total 
gate-to-gate fuel intensity.81 The study found that simply having these 
efficiency behaviors observed combined with a variety of other pilot 
incentives produced a nearly eight thousand metric ton reduction in 
                                                                 
 76. Gosnell et al., supra note 1. 
 77. Id. at 7. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See Thomas Schilling, Thomas Rötger & Kai Wicke, Assessment of the 
Impact of Radically Climate-Friendly Aviation Technologies at 8 (2016), http://elib.
dlr.de/106658/1/2016_GreenerAviation_Paper_AIRCAT_20160906.pdf. 
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fuel use during an eight-month period, representing over twenty four 
thousand metric tons of carbon dioxide not emitted by Virgin 
Atlantic.82 
In addition to the actions just described, a wide range of other 
operational efficiencies can decrease the carbon consequences of civil 
aviation. Reduced thrust takeoff can lower fuel consumption by up to 
23.2%, and can reduce nitric oxide and black carbon emissions to an 
even greater extent.83 Traditional flight plans direct a pilot to reduce 
altitude in steps, requiring engine thrust at each stage of the descent,84 
but a continuous descent can reduce fuel consumption during descent 
by 27%.85 New technologies like the NASA’s Efficient Descent 
Advisor enable air traffic controllers to synchronize the descent of 
incoming aircraft, allowing them to glide through their descent while 
consuming minimal fuel.86 
2. Efficient Technologies 
New aircraft are being designed in ways that make them, on average, 
more efficient than the older aircraft they replace. By the time an 
aircraft is replaced, the new model is typically twenty percent more 
efficient.87 Airlines ordinarily operate aircraft for at least twenty years, 
however.88 This means that the annual efficiency benefits of regular 
fleet turnover occur at less than one percent.89 
                                                                 
 82. Gosnell et al., supra note 1, at 3, 25. 
 83. These figures are based on a study of 3336 takeoff events at London 
Heathrow airport. George S. Koudis et al., Airport Emissions Reductions from 
Reduced Thrust Takeoff Operations, 52 TRANSP. RES. PART D 17, 27 (2017). 
 84. Continuous Descent Approaches, AIR TRANSPORT ACTION GROUP, 
http://aviationbenefits.org/case-studies/continuous-descent-approaches/ 
[https://perma.cc/67VR-DTYW] (last visited Apr. 19, 2017). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Efficient Descent Advisor (EDA), NAT’L AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMIN. 
(last visited Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.aviationsystemsdivision.arc.nasa.gov/
research/tactical/eda.shtml [https://perma.cc/L85L-ESLS]. 
 87. Id. at 132. 
 88. D.I.A. Poll, 21st Century Civil Aviation: Is it On Course or Is It Over-
Confident and Complacent?—Thoughts on the Conundrum of Aviation and the 
Environment, 121 AERONAUTICAL J. 115, 131–32 (2017). 
 89. Id. at 133 
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Radically novel design concepts have the potential to vastly improve 
the rate at which an airline’s fleet efficiency increases.90 Fully electric 
aircraft would provide the most dramatic decrease in emissions, 
eliminating the need for nearly all fossil fuel combustion if the electric 
grid is decarbonized.91 These aircraft currently exist, but because they 
use electric power to turn a propeller and carry heavy batteries, electric 
planes are much slower than their fossil-fueled counterparts.92 
Matching the energy stored in a Boeing 787 Dreamliner’s 223,000 
pounds of jet fuel would take four and a half million pounds of 
batteries—so energy storage technologies will need to improve before 
electric planes become a major component of the world’s fleet.93 
Despite the current need for further technological advancement, it is 
already evident that electric aircraft and fully solar planes will 
eventually be a critical part of a sustainable future for civil aviation. In 
2016 Solar Impulse created the first fully solar aircraft to fly around 
the world.94 That flight averaged only forty-seven miles per hour,95 but 
the project’s founders claim that passengers will fly in solar planes 
within the next ten years.96 Many other firms are actively working to 
realize fully electric short-range passenger aircraft. For example, 
Wright Electric is partnering with EasyJet to develop a battery-
powered 120-passenger aircraft capable of traveling over 300 miles.97 
Airbus is designing fully-electric, hybrid, and small-scale vertical 
take-off aircraft that, in addition to reducing carbon emissions, could 
                                                                 
 90. See generally Schilling et al., supra note 82. 
 91. Id. at 7. We say that these designs would nearly, rather than completely, 
eliminate fossil fuel consumption to acknowledge the use of fossil fuels in the 
manufacturers supply chains and in the materials from which an aircraft is composed, 
even for aircraft that are ultimately all-electric. 
 92. See Samantha Masunaga, No flying Tesla? That’s because electric planes are 
a steeper challenge than electric cars, L.A. TIMES (Sep. 9, 2016, 6:00AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-electric-aircraft-20160830-snap-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/L2V6-KK2F]. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Victoria Bryan, Solar Impulse founder sees electric passenger plane in 10 
years, REUTERS (Dec. 8, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-airlines-tech-
solar-impulse-idUSKBN13X0TD [https://perma.cc/3GUS-5F2P]. 
 95. Masunaga, supra note 93. 
 96. Bryan, supra note 95. 
 97. Angela Monaghan, EasyJet says it could be flying electric planes within a 
decade, GUARDIAN (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/
sep/27/easyjet-electric-planes-wright-electric-flights [https://perma.cc/E987-682G]. 
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reduce infrastructure needs on the ground.98 And Boeing engineers 
working through a NASA contract are exploring a wide range of 
alternative aviation fuel concepts, including advanced batteries, hybrid 
battery-gas turbine propulsion, and many others.99 
Advanced wing shape designs can offer significant efficiency gains 
as well, and these opportunities can be realized with or without 
transitioning to solar power. Two main innovations show substantial 
promise to increase aircraft efficiency: blended wing body designs and 
strut-braced wings. Unlike conventional designs that use wings to lift 
a tube-shaped fuselage, blended wing body designs use the entire body 
of the aircraft as a lifting surface.100 These types of designs could 
reduce the carbon intensity of a given aircraft by nearly fifty percent.101 
The key challenges for widely adopting blended wing body designs 
are infrastructure constraints that limit wingspan, production systems 
that are geared toward traditional designs, and ground services that 
would need to adapt to different aircraft needs.102 
Strut-braced wing aircraft can also be designed more efficiently than 
traditional designs, but they would require changes in airport support 
and may exceed wingspan maximums dictated by ground services.103 
These aircraft use a wider wing to create more lift with less power, 
supported by a brace that makes up for the added stress of having a 
longer wing.104 Airport services would have to be changed to 
accommodate these aircraft, but they can be twenty-nine to sixty-two 
percent more efficient than traditional designs.105 
                                                                 
 98. Airbus, Future of electric flight, AIRBUS (June 18, 2017), http://www.airbus.
com/newsroom/topics-in-focus/electrification.html [https://perma.cc/ZE2V-
TYMW]. 
 99. See MARTY K. BRADLEY & CHRISTOPHER K. DRONEY, SUBSONIC ULTRA 
GREEN AIRCRAFT RESEARCH PHASE II: N+4 ADVANCED CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT, 
NASA/CR–2012-217556 3 (2012), https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.
gov/20120009038.pdf. 
 100. See Schilling et al., supra note 82, at 8. 
 101. Id. at 7. 
 102. See id. at 8. 
 103. See id. at 8. 
 104. See id at 2. 
 105. Id. 
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3. Renewable Fuels 
Alternative fuels derived from renewable sources are another 
option.106 The easiest alternative fuels to adopt are those that resemble 
fossil-derived fuels closely enough to not require major technology or 
infrastructure changes.107 Ensuring that production of these fuels does 
not diminish their net mitigation potential is critical, since even though 
they are renewable, they have land-use and transportation 
implications.108 Acknowledging this problem, governments have set a 
variety of standards for how significant a biofuel’s carbon reduction 
must be.109 Further, ASTM International published a standard 
specifically for aviation fuel containing synthesized standards.110 As 
of 2016, five production methods have met its specifications.111 
The net emissions of biofuels depends on which production method 
is used and can vary significantly.112 Still, the opportunity presented 
by using renewable biofuels in civil aviation is substantial—one recent 
study suggested that if carbon capture during the fuel production 
process is credited to the use of biofuels, their use would result in net 
                                                                 
 106. In its 2016 environmental report, the ICAO recognized that “[t]he use of 
sustainable alternative fuels is an important element of the basket of measures for 
reducing aviation’s impact on the global climate and also on air quality.” INT’L CIVIL 
AVIATION ORG, 2016 ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT 153 (2016), http://www.icao.int/
environmental-protection/Documents/ICAO%20Environmental%20Report%
202016.pdf [hereinafter 2016 ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT]. 
 107. See generally BAILIS ET AL., supra note 24, at 5–35 (describing methods of 
producing drop in fuels that resemble kerosene-based jet fuel). 
 108. Id. at 35 (“There is broad consensus that GHG emissions reductions resulting 
from the use of alternative fuels should be calculated on a life-cycle basis, . . . 
[which] includes recovery and extraction, transport of raw materials, refining and 
processing, transport of the finished product, and combustion.”). 
 109. See id. at 36 (comparing US, EU, California, and Roundtable on Sustainable 
Biomaterials standards for biofuel’s minimum GHG reductions). 
 110. Standard Specification for Aviation Turbine Fuel Containing Synthesized 
Hydrocarbons, ASTM INT’L, https://compass.astm.org/EDIT/html_annot.cgi?
D7566+16b [https://perma.cc/N9B2-W8VE] (last visited Apr. 21, 2017) 
 111. 2016 ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 107, at 153 (“Today, there are 
five pathways that have been approved under ASTM D7566 for producing 
alternative jet fuel and two airports are providing significant quantities of biofuel to 
their customers . . . .”). 
 112. BAILIS ET AL., supra note 24, at 45 (“The magnitude of cumulative emission 
reductions that could result from the use of [this growing supply] of aviation biofuel 
between 2020 and 2035 depends on the specific pathways and feedstocks used.”). 
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negative emissions.113 More conservative estimates are nevertheless 
optimistic, suggesting that biofuels could reduce an aircraft’s 
emissions from twenty-five to seventy-five percent.114 
Price is a key barrier to more widespread use of biofuels however. 
The ICAO recently reported that “[t]he most significant challenge 
affecting the demand for alternative fuels is the tremendous price gap 
between conventional fuels and biofuels for civil aviation. Suppressed 
demand for alternative aviation fuels then, in turn, limits the 
investment in biorefineries that is needed in order to scale up 
production.”115 
4. Demand Reduction 
The ICAO’s preferred avenue for mitigating civil aviation emissions 
is through new technologies, operational efficiencies, and alternative 
fuels.116 But reducing demand for air travel is another way that direct 
reductions in emissions could occur. Given the profit motives of civil 
aviation firms, it is not surprising that specific estimates about the 
extent to which demand reduction can mitigate civil aviation emissions 
are rare, but emissions reductions will arise if it is possible to reduce 
demand. Several proposals have argued that demand reduction is in 
fact the only effective way in the long run to reduce civil aviation 
emissions enough to meet the climate stabilization goals described in 
the Paris Agreement.117 
                                                                 
 113. Marshall Wise, Matteo Muratori & Page Kyle, Biojet Fuels and Emissions 
Mitigation in Aviation: An Integrated Assessment Modeling Analysis 52 TRANSP. 
RES. PART D 244, 252 (2017) (“In our analysis, the production of biojet fuels with 
CCS leads to net negative carbon emissions for each unit of fuel produced. The net 
negative emissions partially offset the carbon emissions from fossil fuel use, and the 
viability of CCS greatly enhances the mitigation potential of biojet fuels.”). 
 114. BAILIS ET AL., supra note 24, at 45 (“using the HEFA pathway with lower-
performing soy, rapeseed and jatropha, for example  . . . we assume that replacing jet 
fuel with these fuels reduces CO2 emissions by 25% . . . [using different underlying 
materials with the same HEFA pathway] yields average CO2 reductions of 75%.”). 
 115. 2016 ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 107, at 153. 
 116. See Int’l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], Resolution. A39-3, para. 2 (Oct. 2016) 
[hereinafter Res. A39-3] (“[The ICAO] affirms the preference for the use of aircraft 
technologies, operational improvements and sustainable alternative fuels that 
provide the environmental benefits within the aviation sector.”). 
 117. See, e.g., Philip Cafaro, Reducing Consumption to Avert Catastrophic Global 
Climate Change: the Case of Aviation, NAT. SCI. 99 (2013) (“[I]n the real world, 
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II. PUBLIC GOVERNANCE 
In light of the substantial contributions of global civil aviation to 
climate change and the options available to reduce those contributions, 
an obvious first question is what international, national, and 
subnational public governance initiatives can do to reduce civil 
aviation emissions. This Part describes barriers to international public 
governance efforts, the status of the general international legal 
framework for addressing climate change, and the specific government 
regulatory instruments that have targeted civil aviation. Governments 
face many challenges regulating carbon emissions that are not unique 
to the civil aviation sector, including economic interests that favor 
fossil fuel use, domestic collective action problems, and deep 
worldview differences. These challenges have been fully described in 
the literature, 118 and we focus here on the particular challenges posed 
by civil aviation. 
A. Challenges to International Public Governance 
The transnational character of civil aviation creates several 
significant challenges for public-governance-based approaches. It 
almost goes without saying that the jurisdiction of national 
governments ends at national boundaries, limiting the extent to which 
nation states can coerce other nations and private actors outside its 
borders to reduce emissions.119 In addition, a collective action problem 
                                                                 
right now, people need to fly less, in order to avert catastrophic global climate 
change.”); Andrew Macintosh & Lailey Wallace, International Aviation Emissions 
to 2025: Can Emissions be Stabilized Without Restricting Demand?, 37 ENERGY 
POL’Y 264, 272 (2009) (“Stabilizing international aviation emissions at level 
consistent with risk averse climate targets without restricting demand will be 
extremely difficult.”); Benoît Chève et al., Will Technological Progress be Sufficient 
to Stabilize CO2 Emissions from Air Transport in the Mid-Term?, 28 TRANSP. RES. 
PART D 91 (2013) (answering the article’s titular question in the negative). 
 118. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: 
Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1154–
1234 (2009) (discussing challenges of climate change to public governance); 
Michael P. Vandenbergh & Kaitlin T. Raimi, Climate Change: Leveraging Legacy, 
42 ECOLOGY L.Q. 139, 145–70 (2014) (discussing worldview-based challenges and 
the socio-temporal trap). 
 119. See Timothy William Waters, “The Momentous Gravity of the “State of 
Things Now Obtaining”: Annoying Westphalian Objections to the Idea of Global 
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arises at the international level.120 Emissions from any one country will 
affect the global climate, so no single national government, however 
motivated to lead the way, can fully resolve the climate problem.121 
Absent an international agreement that incorporates all major emitters 
and creates motivations for compliance, a danger exists that free-rider 
states could decline to impose limits on aircraft that operate within 
them, while still enjoying a reduced risk of suffering climate harms. 
These problems are exacerbated by the difficulty of determining which 
state should be assigned responsibility for flights between countries 
and over international waters. 
Because many states see binding international regulation as an 
affront to their national sovereignty, an additional barrier stands in the 
way of reducing civil aviation emissions.122 The fear that strong 
                                                                 
Governance, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 25, 33 (2009) (“The remembered 
Westphalian system was marked by the factual existence of (and normative support 
for) self-legitimating states, whose people and processes were their own concern.”); 
see also Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International 
Regulation Through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the 
Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 501, 534 (2009) (“No global 
“state” has authority to adopt mandatory regulations or impose sanctions. States are 
jealous of their sovereignty and freedom of action, and resist delegating authority to 
international institutions.”). 
 120. Michael P. Vandenbergh, Reconceptualizing the Future of Environmental 
Law: The Role of Private Climate Governance, 32 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 382, 384–
85 (2015) (“As to the problems of today, climate change is simply different from 
earlier threats. Whether it is ‘the mother of all collective action problems’ or just the 
most challenging collective action problem, no environmental threat addressed by 
the statutory framework erected in 1970–1990 matches climate change in the 
magnitude and irreversibility of the potential harm . . . .”) 
 121. See generally Robert O. Keohane & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex 
for Climate Change, The Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements: 
Discussion Paper No. 2010–33 (“Climate change is politically a difficult problem for 
three fundamental reasons. First, it is a global problem, whose solution cannot be 
achieved through the efforts of any single state or small group of states.”); Daniel H. 
Cole, From Global to Polycentric Climate Governance, 2 CLIMATE L. 395, 398 
(2011) (“Even when global governance is necessary, institutions established at the 
international or global level are never sufficient, by themselves, for successfully 
resolving global problems.”). 
 122. See Kenneth W. Abbott, Strengthening the Transnational Regime Complex 
for Climate Change, 88 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 543 (2012) (“Even voluntary norms 
addressing private actors can reduce state control of domestic economic activity or 
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international conventions undermine national autonomy has famously 
motivated the United States’ failure to ratify the Convention on the 
Law of the Sea.123 International aviation is, by definition, transport 
among different nations—each of which enjoys “complete and 
exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.”124 Further, 
“[a]ircraft have the nationality of the State in which they are 
registered.”125 Thus no individual state can set environmental 
guidelines for civil aviation generally. And although a national or sub-
national government could impose limits on the aircraft in its own 
registry, or on the aircraft that visit its airports, doing so will come at 
a political and economic cost.126 
The challenge to international action is further complicated by the 
mismatch between when mitigation expenditures may occur and when 
the benefits will occur. The greatest harms of climate change will not 
occur in the near-term but will instead be felt by future generations.127 
As a result, there is a tendency to undervalue the importance of those 
effects, particularly when confronting global disparities in economic 
development.128 At the same time, delays in national and international 
                                                                 
be perceived as invading sovereignty; they are sometimes opposed even by 
governments generally favorable to environmental action.”). 
 123. See, e.g., James L. Malone, The United States and the Law of the Sea, 24 VA. 
J. INT’L L. 785, 785–86 (1984) (arguing that “President [Reagan] correctly viewed 
the seabed mining provisions in the proposed Convention as clearly inconsistent with 
vital national interests [and he] was unwilling to compromise those interests for the 
sake of world opinion or American participation in a global regime . . . .”). 
 124. Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 
U.N.T.S. 295 art. 1 [hereinafter Chicago Convention]. 
 125. Id. art 17. 
 126. To the extent that stricter environmental requirements raise costs for civil 
aviation, they can provide an incentive not to register in a particular state, to raise 
passenger fees for flights into an environmentally-restrictive state, or otherwise 
penalize an outlier jurisdiction. 
 127. See Keohane & Victor, supra note 122, at 9 (“[T]he negative effects of 
climate change are not observable now, but are only expected to occur some years 
into the future. It is therefore an intergenerational problem: present generations are 
expected to pay costs for the benefit of their successes two or more generations into 
the future. . . . [and] costs borne today are in the interests of successor generations.”) 
 128. Vandenbergh, supra note 121, at 385 (“Psychologists tell us that near-term, 
vivid, local events are most likely to affect beliefs, norms and behavior, but the most 
certain and most severe climate events are far easier to project over a long-term and 
global scale.”) 
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action are important because current carbon emissions are locking in 
climate and sea level effects for hundreds or thousands of years. Thus, 
even though the ultimate costs of mitigating the effects of climate 
change will be very large and are being locked in now (absent the 
development of low-cost carbon removal technologies), the bulk of 
those costs will not arise until well into the future. Even if they use an 
extremely low discount rate, opponents of near-term action may argue 
that little present expense is justified in avoiding even very large long-
term harms.129 Coupled with uncertainties about the ultimate cost of 
public governance, these economic uncertainties complicate 
international negotiations,130 and suggest that a dramatic increase in 
public pressure or political will to undertake public governance is 
unlikely, at least in the near term. 
On a related note, deep differences exist about the distribution of 
responsibility for civil aviation emissions reductions among nation 
states. Individual states have varying degrees of willingness and 
capacity to enforce environmental regulations, and debates about the 
respective responsibilities of the developed and developing nations 
have emerged regarding civil aviation as they have regarding other 
sources of carbon emissions. A recent analysis identified the deep 
divide between developed and developing countries as an important 
challenge to action on civil aviation at the international level.131 
Similar collective action, temporal, justice and other problems arise at 
                                                                 
 129. Id. (“The value of the climate change harms that will be avoided in future 
centuries is miniscule in the calculus after the application of almost any non-zero 
discount rate.”) 
 130. Richard B. Stewart, Michael Oppenheimer, & Bryce Rudyk, Building A More 
Effective Global Climate Regime Through A Bottom-Up Approach, 14 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 273, 280 (2013) (“[U]uncertainties regarding mitigation costs and 
future economic conditions, which together make many governments reluctant or 
unwilling to make legally binding international treaty commitments to achieve major 
quantified reductions five to ten years in the future.”); Daniel H. Cole, The Problem 
of Shared Irresponsibility in International Climate Law, in DISTRIBUTION OF 
RESPONSIBILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 290, 293 (André Nollkaemper & Dov 
Jacobs, eds. 2015) (“Uneven distribution of costs and benefits expected from 
moderate climate change reduces incentives for wide sharing of responsibility.”). 
 131. MARKUS W. GEHRING & CAIRO A. R. ROBB, ADDRESSING THE AVIATION AND 
CLIMATE CHANGE CHALLENGE 11-12 (2013), https://www.ictsd.org/sites/default/
files/research/2013/08/addressing-the-aviation-and-climate-change-challenge.pdf. 
As Gehring & Robb note, the EU acted unilaterally after not being satisfied with the 
ICAO efforts. Id. at 12, 15. 
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the national and subnational levels, but as we mentioned above these 
problems have been discussed at length elsewhere.132 
In total, these challenges make it unlikely that a general international 
agent or a civil aviation-focused international agent with adequate 
targets and participation by all major emitting countries will emerge in 
the next decade.133 Nevertheless, substantial progress has been made 
by ICAO as a result of the availability of low-cost carbon offsets. The 
following overview of existing public governance reflects the 
challenges that the existing regime has confronted in attempting to 
reduce carbon emissions from civil aviation. 
B. International Initiatives 
1. Aviation in International Climate Governance 
The negotiation of the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was a watershed moment for 
international action on climate.134 But in the decades that have 
followed, consensus has developed that it has been unsuccessful at 
“achieving its lofty goal to achieve stabilization of greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system . . . .”135 
                                                                 
 132. See Abbott, supra note 123. 
 133. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, The Governance Triangle: 
Regulatory Standards Institutions and the Shadow of the State, in THE POLITICS OF 
GLOBAL REGULATION 44, 57–58 (Walter Mattli and Ngaire Woods, eds. 2009) 
(“[S]tates as a group vary greatly in their will and capacity to regulate. Some 
governments are captured or corrupt. Governments in developing countries . . . often 
view regulation as a tradeoff against economic growth, and lack the information, 
resources and technical competence to manage complex regulation.”); Stewart et al., 
supra note 131, at 280 (“Domestic priorities and political circumstances in many 
major MEF jurisdictions, together with the difficulties in securing adequate 
compliance assurance arrangements to deal with free-riding, are major reasons for 
the lack of progress.”) 
 134. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 
1771 U.N.T.S. 107. 
 135. TRUXAL, supra note 26, at 130 (“[T]he consensus view is that to date the 
UNFCCC process has generally delivered ‘inadequate results,’ owing to what many 
consider to be an overly ambitious approach.”); Timothy Meyer, How Local 
Discrimination Can Promote Global Public Goods, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1937, 2012 
(2015) (“The twenty-first century is one of disillusionment with global institutions. 
No longer do commentators and politicians hold out hope that the WTO, the 
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Article 2.2 of the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC directed Annex I 
parties to address emissions from aviation, but do so through the 
ICAO: “The Parties included in Annex I shall pursue limitation or 
reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the 
Montreal Protocol from aviation and marine bunker fuels, working 
through the International Civil Aviation Organization and the 
International Maritime Organization, respectively.”136 
Accordingly, the 2015 Paris Agreement excluded international 
shipping and civil aviation.137 Although these omissions were dubbed 
“conspicuous holes” in the days after the Agreement was negotiated,138 
their exclusion from the Kyoto Protocol more than a decade earlier 
renders their omission in the Paris Agreement unsurprising. Still, the 
Paris Agreement did represent some international recommitment to 
climate goals,139 and it may facilitate national action on domestic 
flights where states choose to include action on domestic aviation in 
their individually determined national commitments.140 
2. The International Civil Aviation Organization 
The core of the international legal system regulating civil aviation is 
the Chicago System, named for the Convention on International Civil 
                                                                 
UNFCCC, or the UN Security Council will serve as the primary fora in which to 
resolve global challenges.”). 
 136. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, art. 2.2, Dec. 11, 1997, FCCC/CP/1997/L.7/Add.1. 
 137. Paris Agreement, Dec. 12, 2015, U.N. Doc. No. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev. 
 138. Benjamin Hulac, Rules for ship, airplane emissions left out of Paris deal, 
CLIMATEWIRE (Dec. 14, 2015), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2015/12/14/
stories/1060029447 [https://perma.cc/LB79-ZZFP]. 
 139. Despite being hailed as a significant step toward meaningful international 
climate action, commenters have severe disappointment about what the Paris 
Agreement actually accomplished. See, e.g., George Monbiot, Grand promises of 
Paris climate deal undermined by squalid retrenchments, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 12, 
2015), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/georgemonbiot/2015/dec/12/
paris-climate-deal-governments-fossil-fuels [https://perma.cc/5XW8-UW72]. 
 140. Top 3 misconceptions about CORSIA, ICAO, http://www.icao.int/
environmental-protection/Pages/A39_CORSIA_FAQ6.aspx (last visited Apr. 23, 
2017) (“Emissions from domestic aviation are considered under the UNFCCC. 
Therefore, Parties to the UNFCCC have the possibility of addressing these emissions 
in their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement, as 
part of their actions aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions from domestic 
sources.”). 
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Aviation (“Chicago Convention” or “Convention”), signed in Chicago 
in 1944.141 The Chicago Convention established an international air 
law, and constituted the ICAO.142 In its original form, the Chicago 
Convention contained a number of core principles that remain 
important today. In Article 12, the signatories agreed that each nation 
state would adopt measures to ensure that both aircraft registered in 
the state and foreign aircraft flying within its territory would comply 
with the state’s rules and regulations.143 In support of this ambition, 
the parties agreed to endeavor to keep their regulations uniform to the 
greatest extent possible.144 In the same article, the parties agreed to 
extend the Convention’s rules to flights over the high seas.145 Under 
the original convention, aircraft have the nationality of the state in 
which they are registered,146 and must possess a certificate of 
airworthiness issued by its registering state.147 The Convention also 
established the ICAO, one purpose of which was to “[m]eet the needs 
of the peoples of the world for safe, regular, efficient and economical 
air transport . . . .”148 
Each of those provisions has survived to the most recent ninth 
edition of the Convention.149 With 190 states now within the 
Convention, it enjoys nearly universal membership.150 ICAO 
addresses civil aviation emissions in a number of ways, including 
facilitating research, promulgating standards, policies and guidance on 
aircraft noise, emissions, and operations.151 The ICAO’s most 
prominent action to address the industry’s climate implications is its 
                                                                 
 141. Chicago Convention, supra note 125. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. art 12. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. art 17. 
 147. Id. art 31. 
 148. Id. art 43–44(d). 
 149. ICAO, Convention on International Civil Aviation, ICAO Doc 7300/9 
(2006). 
 150. Convention on International Civil Aviation – Doc 7300, ICAO (last visited 
Apr. 19, 2017), http://www.icao.int/publications/Pages/doc7300.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/36BG-3S66]. 
 151. Environmental Protection, ICAO (last visited Apr. 20, 2017), http://www.
icao.int/environmental-protection/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/S6LE-
383U]. 
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Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation 
(CORSIA), adopted in October 2016.152 
3. CORSIA 
CORSIA’s target is to freeze carbon dioxide emissions beginning in 
2020 levels, and to phase in a system offsetting emissions above those 
levels, except where special circumstances render the requirement too 
burdensome.153 In its initial formulation, CORSIA does not 
specifically designate which offsets will satisfy the program, but it 
notes that “emissions units generated from mechanisms established 
under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement are eligible for use in 
CORSIA.”154 This offsetting scheme will be implemented in stages, 
beginning with voluntary pilot and first phases that will run from 2021 
through 2023,155 and 2024 to 2027 respectively.156 The program 
becomes mandatory for member states in 2027, except for Least 
Developed Countries, Small Island Developing States, and 
Landlocked Developing Countries.157 The United States is currently a 
signatory to the Chicago Convention and has committed to joining the 
voluntary first phase of CORSIA.158 In light of the history of the 
United States with agreements that acknowledge different 
                                                                 
 152. Res. A39-3, supra note 117. 
 153. Id. para. 5. 
 154. Id. para. 21. 
 155. Id. para. 9(a). 
 156. Id. para. 9(b). 
 157. Id. para. 9(e). 
 158. LEADERS’ STATEMENT ON A NORTH AMERICAN CLIMATE, CLEAN ENERGY, 
AND ENVIRONMENT PARTNERSHIP (June 29, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/06/29/leaders-statement-north-american-
climate-clean-energy-and-environment [https://perma.cc/5GB3-CZNW] (“We 
support the adoption by all countries in 2016 of the market-based measure proposed 
through the International Civil Aviation Organization to allow for carbon-neutral 
growth from international civil aviation from 2020 onwards and will join the first 
phase of the measure adopted.”). Although the present administration does not 
appear to have publicly spoken on whether the United States remains committed to 
joining the first phase of the measure, the Federal Aviation Administration’s 2018 
Fiscal Year Business Plan, published in March of 2018, includes an activity target 
that suggests continued work toward domestic implementation of CORSIA: “Initiate 
domestic implementation of CORSIA Standard and Recommended Practices, once 
available from ICAO.” FAA, FY2018 APL BUSINESS PLAN 17, https://www.faa.gov/
about/plans_reports/media/2018/apl_business_plan.pdf. 
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responsibilities for certain parties, the extent to which the United States 
will continue to support CORSIA is unclear.159 Further, since the 
United States has withdrawn from the Paris Agreement, it has less 
incentive to meet the CORSIA goals.160 
In adopting CORSIA, the ICAO acknowledged that new 
technologies, operational improvements, and alternative fuels—
apparently even in light of existing efficiency incentives for airlines—
are not delivering sufficient emissions reductions: the environmental 
benefits from aircraft technologies, operational improvements and 
sustainable alternative fuels may not deliver sufficient CO2 emissions 
reductions to address the growth of international air traffic, in time to 
achieve the global aspirational goal of keeping the global net CO2 
emissions from international aviation from 2020 at the same level.161 
Thus the function of the CORSIA offset program is “to complement 
a broader package of measures to achieve the global aspirational 
goal”162 of freezing civil aviation emissions at 2020 levels, and to do 
so without imposing an “inappropriate economic burden on 
international aviation.”163 
                                                                 
 159. This imbalance ultimately led the United States to reject the Kyoto Protocol, 
based on its inclusion of different requirements for developing country parties. See 
S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1998) (enacted) (“[T]he United States should not be a 
signatory to any protocol [which would] mandate new commitments to limit or 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions for the Annex I Parties, unless the protocol or other 
agreement also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties within the same 
compliance period.”). President Trump’s comments suggest that his administration 
shares this attitude toward climate commitments. See Megan Darby, Trump 
complains US share of climate finance is unfair, CLIMATEHOME (Apr. 28, 2017), 
http://www.climatechangenews.com/2017/04/28/trump-complains-us-share-
climate-finance-unfair/ [https://perma.cc/ZHC7-V9DV]. 
 160. See Valerie Volcovici, U.S. submits formal notice of withdrawal from Paris 
climate pact, REUTERS (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-
climate-usa-paris/u-s-submits-formal-notice-of-withdrawal-from-paris-climate-
pact-idUSKBN1AK2FM [https://perma.cc/DW5F-3ESK]. 
 161. Res. A39-3, supra note 117, para 3. 
 162. Id. para 4 
 163. Id. 
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4. ICAO and CORSIA Limitations 
CORSIA confronts several shortcomings, and commenters have 
been quick to point out its limitations.164 The scheme’s target of 
stabilizing emissions at 2020 levels allows emissions to continue to 
grow until that time and fails to provide an incentive for civil aviation 
to further reduce its emissions. The scheme’s reservations are a further 
barrier—until 2027 participation is voluntary.165 
The goal of CORSIA— freezing civil aviation emissions from all 
participating states at 2020 levels— is valuable, but it is insufficient if 
the objective is for civil aviation to bear its proportionate share of the 
reductions necessary to avoid a substantial risk of exceeding the 2 
degree goal included in the Paris Agreement, much less than 1.5 degree 
aspiration.166 For instance, the 1.5 degree target requires that global 
emissions peak no later than 2020, but emissions must also decrease 
steeply in the years following, not stabilize at 2020 levels as provided 
for in CORSIA.167 Thus the implicit assumption built into CORSIA is 
that other sectors will reduce emissions even more significantly than 
civil aviation, and that civil aviation will comprise an increasingly 
large portion of total anthropogenic carbon emissions. The decision to 
use offsetting is therefore only a near-term response that buys time for 
long-term progress toward a carbon-neutral civil aviation sector.168 
                                                                 
 164. James Beard, A global climate deal for aviation! So what next?, 
CLIMATEHOME (Nov. 10, 2016), http://www.climatechangenews.com/2016/10/11/a-
global-climate-deal-for-aviation-so-what-next/ [https://perma.cc/354B-3PTS] 
(“Here are the bad points: It’s just offsetting. And so it doesn’t send a strong price 
signal to the industry to innovate or to passengers to fly less. It’s nice-sounding target 
of “carbon neutral growth from 2020” (CNG2020) is actually pretty weak, and ICAO 
is only set to achieve around three quarters of that goal (so far).”). 
 165. CARBON MARKET WATCH, THE CORSIA: ICAO’S MARKET BASED 
MEASURE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPE (2016), http://carbonmarketwatch.org/
wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Post-Assembly-Policy-Brief-Web-1.pdf [hereinafter 
CORSIA: IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPE]. 
 166. Id. at 2; Paris Agreement, supra note 138, art. 2. 
 167. Johan Rockström et al., A Roadmap for Rapid Decarbonization, 335 SCI. 
MAG. 1269, 1269 (2017). 
 168. CORSIA: IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPE, supra note 166, at 2 (“For each 
additional ton of CO2 emitted, offsetting reduces that ton in another location, a zero-
sum exercise that balances out the carbon entering the atmosphere. However, if the 
reduction lacks environmental integrity . . . there is an overall increase of emissions 
in the atmosphere.) 
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Aside from CORSIA’s specific limitations, more fundamental 
limitations hinder the effectiveness of any ICAO action to reduce 
carbon emissions from civil aviation. The ICAO is the 
intergovernmental organization tasked in part with reducing emissions 
from civil aviation,169 but it lacks enforcement tools. Since an ICAO 
resolution is not automatically binding, it will have to be implemented 
through later-promulgated standards.170 ICAO resolutions are thus 
difficult to enforce for at least four reasons. First, a state may hesitate 
to enforce obligations on its own air carriers if other states refuse to 
follow suit.171 Second, differences in enforcement capacity may 
generate different enforcement outcomes even if states intend to apply 
standards uniformly.172 Third, a state that determines that it is 
impracticable to comply with an ICAO standard may simply choose 
not to do so.173 And fourth, although the Chicago Convention allows a 
state to deny an air carrier entry if that carrier has breached an 
obligation, that extraordinary remedy has never been invoked.174 In 
short, although the ICAO represents a step forward by the international 
public governance regime, it has adopted a goal that is modest at best, 
is unlikely to be achieved until 2027 at the earliest and will be subject 
to substantial enforcement challenges along the way. 
                                                                 
 169. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 137, art. 2.2. 
 170. Alejandro Piera, Designing the Legal Form of a Global Aviation Market 
Based Measure, 10 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 144, 145 (2016). 
 171. Id. at 145; see also supra Section III.A. 
 172. See Piera, supra note 171, at 145. (“States may exercise different levels of 
enforcement (e.g. different levels of monetary sanctions), leading to market 
distortions.”). 
 173. Pamela Campos, Compliance Tools for a Global Market Based Measure for 
International Aviation, 10 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 153, 157 (2016) (“States are 
not categorically required to follow or implement standards. If a State “finds it is 
impracticable to comply in all respects,” to “bring its own regulations or practices 
into full accord,” or “deems it necessary to adopt regulations or practices differing 
in any particular respect” from a standard, it can establish differing regulations, as 
long as it provides notification to ICAO.”) (quoting Chicago Convention, supra note 
125, art. 38). 
 174. Campos, supra note 174, at 157. 
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III. PRIVATE GOVERNANCE OPTIONS 
Private governance provides additional options for reducing the 
climate effects of civil aviation. International governmental 
organizations can claim authority derived from their association with 
national governments and international agreements, but they move 
slowly and have limited capacity to set and enforce adequate 
standards.175 Private governance initiatives can bypass many of the 
barriers that make civil aviation so difficult for public governance. In 
Part III, we examine several existing and potential new private 
initiatives and explain why they can motivate climate mitigation 
efforts despite these barriers. As noted earlier, the term civil aviation 
refers to the commercial transport of both passengers and freight. We 
focus here on the opportunity for private governance regarding 
passenger travel, but air freight has already been the subject of several 
private initiatives, and we believe that it is worthy of additional efforts. 
Although we identify private governance examples here, 
development of a comprehensive agenda is beyond the scope of this 
Article. Instead, we recommend formation of a multi-stakeholder 
panel to develop such an agenda. The panel could include 
representatives from the civil aviation industry, advocacy and service 
groups, philanthropists, affected sectors such as finance and travel 
services, and employee and community groups. It could conduct a 
rigorous study of the opportunities for private initiatives to achieve 
emissions reductions, identify gaps in current private initiatives, and 
propose new initiatives to pursue the most promising opportunities. 
A. The Emerging Understanding of Private Ordering 
Why is private governance well-situated to fill some of the gaps in 
public governance regarding civil aviation? In the last several decades, 
social scientists have demonstrated that private actors sometimes 
organize in ways that perform governmental functions. For instance, 
more than a decade ago Thomas Dietz, Elinor Ostrom, and Paul Stern 
pointed to a large and growing literature suggesting that Garrett 
Hardin’s vision of the tragedy of the commons, which is commonly 
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ICAO has no enforcement authority in a strict legal sense.”) (citations omitted). 
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thought to require a government response, is not inevitable.176 
Research pioneered by Ostrom and others demonstrated that resources 
can be sustainably managed without traditional government 
intervention when they can be monitored at low cost, their users are 
embedded in strong social networks that have effective means of 
excluding outsiders, and rule enforcement is supported by the users 
themselves.177 In many cases, these conditions arise when small 
groups manage discrete resources, and the most well-known example 
involves the informal groups that manage the lobster harvest off the 
coast of Maine.178 
At first glance, the global civil aviation sector—including airlines, 
pilots, manufacturers, and airport operators, among others—appears to 
exhibit few of these characteristics. This might suggest that global civil 
aviation is a poor candidate for private climate mitigation efforts, but 
recent research in law, political science, international relations, 
economics and other fields has expanded the early work on private 
ordering and has provided insights that explain why a wide range of 
private actors at the domestic and global levels can make important 
contributions to environmental protection. This research has 
demonstrated that private ordering can occur regarding local, regional, 
and global environmental issues even when one or more of the Ostrom 
                                                                 
 176. See Thomas Dietz, Elinor Ostrom, and Paul C. Stern, The Struggle to Govern 
the Commons, 302 SCI. 1907, 1907 (2003) (suggesting that Hardin’s view was 
limited by assuming that governmental institutions were the only way to sustain 
common pool resources, and that users were trapped in the system without the ability 
to create solutions); see also Daniel H. Cole, Advantages of a Polycentric Approach 
to Climate Change Policy 5 NAT. CLIMATE CHANGE 114, 117 (2015) (“That 
subglobal negotiations and agreements might not reduce GHG emissions rapidly 
enough to forestall the need for adaptation and/or geoengineering is no reason to 
maintain an exclusive focus on global policies that have failed and global 
negotiations that remain stalled.”). 
 177. Dietz, Ostrom & Stern, supra note 177, at 1908. 
 178. Around the time that Ostrom and colleagues were identifying the 
characteristics of successful private management of common pool resources, 
research in law and economics scholars were noting the role of social norms in 
steering the conduct of participants in these types of communities. See, e.g., ROBERT 
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991) (examining the role of social norms in 
interactions between farmers and ranchers in Shasta County, California). 
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characteristics do not exist,179 and it has focused in recent years on the 
private response to climate change.180 
In theory a government carbon tax, cap and trade program, or 
regulatory scheme could motivate aviation firms to reduce carbon 
emissions, and any of these measures could be adopted by the major 
emitting nations and coordinated through an international agreement. 
Of course, in practice this process has been difficult at best. The Paris 
Agreement reflects participation from almost all nations, but it 
achieved this level of participation by reducing the expectations of the 
participants. On the domestic level, the prospects for adequate federal, 
state, and local government action over the next several years are dim 
at best.181 Even though polling in the US for much of the last two 
decades has indicated that most voters support some type of 
government climate mitigation, support for government action on the 
issues is not intense, and climate change is among the most polarized 
issues.182 As the last two decades have demonstrated, economic and 
                                                                 
 179. See Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 168 (“[A]lthough the global nature of some 
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 180. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Climate Change: The China Problem, 81 SO. 
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 182. For a discussion, see VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, BEYOND POLITICS, ch. 3. 
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ideologically-motivated interests can block government climate 
mitigation measures in the United States even when most voters 
express some level of support for these types of measures. 
Although private governance initiatives are an option, it is important 
to remember that they are not a first-best response: They cannot 
achieve the large-scale emissions reductions that a carbon price or an 
effective regulatory scheme can achieve.183 At the same time, they are 
an important second-best approach because they can bypass the 
barriers to government action in the near term by harnessing existing 
preferences for mitigation, and can do so at low cost.184 For instance, 
companies may be motivated to reduce carbon emissions because they 
respond not just to government regulatory pressure regarding climate 
change, but also to pressure from retail and corporate customers, 
lenders, investors, employees, and others.185 In some cases, companies 
can respond to this pressure at low or negative cost by identifying 
energy efficiency and other cost-saving opportunities, as the Virgin 
Atlantic example suggests. In addition, they can transfer this pressure 
for emissions reductions to their suppliers and others around the globe 
through supply chain contracting requirements. Furthermore, research 
suggests that much of the resistance to climate mitigation is based on 
worldview or ideological concerns about big government, and by 
relying on actions by the private sector private initiatives may be able 
to bypass these concerns, broadening the support for mitigation efforts 
to include greater numbers of conservatives and libertarians.186 
Developments in the private sector over the last decade also 
demonstrate that private governance is not just a theoretical possibility. 
For instance, Microsoft recently committed to become carbon neutral 
                                                                 
 183. Id. at ch. 3 & 4. 
 184. Id. at ch. 4. 
 185. For a brief list of drivers of corporate participation in climate initiatives, see 
Vandenbergh, The Drivers of Corporate Climate Mitigation, supra note 12, at 29. In 
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and achieved that goal within several years.187 Walmart recently 
worked with two environmental groups to reduce 28 million metric 
tons of emissions from its supply chains, an amount equal to roughly 
half of the annual emissions from the U.S. iron and steel sector, and it 
has committed to reduce a billion tons by 2030, an amount equal to all 
of the emissions from Germany or Japan.188 In other work, one of us 
has argued that corporate private governance initiatives can contribute 
half a billion tons per year in emissions reductions each year over the 
next decade.189 In addition, private initiatives can target other sectors, 
including households, religious organizations, civic and cultural 
organizations, and colleges and universities, and the total reductions 
from private climate governance can reach more than a billion tons per 
year. 190 
B. Private Governance Options for Civil Aviation 
In Part III.B we match several barriers to government civil aviation 
efforts with private initiatives that may be able to bypass them. We 
start with the barriers at the international level and then turn to barriers 
that arise at the national and subnational levels as well. 
1. Overcoming International Coordination Problems 
As the ICAO discussion in Part II suggests, efforts to adopt 
international climate measures for civil aviation are remarkably 
difficult. On top of the problems that have plagued the UNFCCC 
process generally, the global presence and emissions of civil aviation 
make it a particularly challenging area for governments to regulate. 
The potential for private initiatives at the global level arises because 
they harness market power and resources rather than governmental 
authority, allowing them to bypass national boundaries and transfer 
pressure and resources for emissions reductions around the world. This 
can happen without the need to coordinate among nations and thus 
                                                                 
 187. See Sarah E. Light, The New Insider Trading: Environmental Markets Within 
the Firm, 34 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 41 (2015) (discussing Microsoft’s carbon 
commitment and internal carbon tax). 
 188. VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 5, at ch. 5 (citing Walmart and other 
examples). 
 189. Id. at ch. 1 & 5. 
 190. Id. at ch. 9. 
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without the ability of any one uncooperative government to undercut 
the effort. For instance, a retail airline customer in Denmark or 
Indonesia can affect the carbon emissions of an airline based in China 
for a flight that occurs over international waters, all without any 
government participation. Retail and corporate (e.g., company and 
group travel) airline markets, air freight markets, and financial markets 
are global, as are many supply chains for airplanes, equipment, fuel, 
and other goods and services. As a result, private pressure for 
emissions reductions can use markets to bypass the barriers posed by 
sovereign boundaries. 
Environmental requirements in the supply chain contracts of civil 
aviation firms provide many avenues through which firms can impose 
environmental standards on others without regard to international 
boundaries.191 Travel agents, booking services, corporate travel 
offices, and organizations that host large conventions can make 
travelers’ carbon emissions a criterion in flight selection processes. 
Airlines can require that new aircraft meet increasingly stringent 
efficiency standards and can promote alternative fuels. 
Pressure from socially responsible lenders and investment funds 
also can transcend national boundaries.192 Perhaps the best recent 
example is the role that CDP has played in creating motivations for 
climate mitigation by airlines and other corporations around the world. 
CDP (formerly the Carbon Disclosure Project) uses the influence of 
investors with over $100 trillion in assets to induce carbon emissions 
                                                                 
 191. See Larry Catá Backer, Private Actors and Public Governance Beyond the 
State: The Multinational Corporation, the Financial Stability Board, and the Global 
Governance Order, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 751, 768 (2011) 
(“[C]orporations seek to regularize behavior through the application of behavioral 
norms or standards generated by other groups-particularly nongovernmental 
organizations that certify products and set standards, or standard-setters concerned 
with substantive rules for product production and quality.”); Li-Wen Lin, Legal 
Transplants Through Private Contracting: Codes of Vendor Conduct in Global 
Supply Chains As an Example, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 711, 716 (2009) (“[M]ultinational 
companies, backed by their strong bargaining power, have transmitted a new legal 
order to developing countries through contracting with local suppliers . . . .”); 
Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private 
Contracting in Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. REV. 913 (2007) (concluding that 
more than half of the corporations in eight sectors impose environmental supply 
chain requirements on their suppliers). 
 192. VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 5, at Preface (citing studies). 
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disclosure by a large number of firms around the globe.193 In 2017, 
Delta, American Airlines, United, Southwest, Boeing, Airbus, 
disclosed climate data to CDP, along with other firms in the civil 
aviation sector.194 This disclosure allows investors to determine which 
firms are reducing their emissions and motivates the participating 
firms to reduce emissions. And by voting their shares in favor of 
efficient practices and other carbon-reducing opportunities, corporate 
shareholders can exercise a degree of climate-mitigating control over 
corporate behavior from within the corporation, all of which can 
transcend national boundaries. 
Given the importance of offsets to the CORSIA effort, and the 
likelihood that offsets will be a part of new private initiatives, private 
purchaser standards for offsets, which can address quality concerns, 
can play an important role as well. An example is the Gold Standard, 
a private standard established by the World Wildlife Fund and other 
international groups. The Gold Standard originally focused on 
establishing and monitoring best practices for projects under the UN’s 
Clean Development Mechanism but has broadened its focus in recent 
years.195 This is a topic that is already on the agenda of CORSIA for 
the offsets contemplated in CORSIA’s climate program. 
As we noted in Part II.A, disagreements between developed and 
developing nations have posed a barrier to many international 
governmental initiatives, including as the ICAO civil aviation effort.196 
The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change process assigns 
developed and developing countries “common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities.” Disputes about the 
meaning of this term, however, have hindered the ability of the ICAO 
to produce and implement standards that will achieve major emissions 
reductions from global civil aviation.197 
                                                                 
 193. About Us, CDP, https://www.cdp.net/en/info/about-us 
[https://perma.cc/8CEW-WANF] (last visited May 5, 2017). 
 194. See CDP, Companies, https://www.cdp.net/en/companies 
[https://perma.cc/929E-5JFV] (last visited July 10, 2018). 
 195. Our Purpose, GOLD STANDARD, http://www.goldstandard.org/our-story/
who-we-are [https://perma.cc/XQJ2-Q36L] (last visited July 10, 2018). 
 196. For a recent overview, see GEHRING & ROBB, supra note 132, discussion at 
n.108-110. 
 197. See, e.g., id. at 11 (concluding that “[a] second major obstacle has been a 
political debate about differentiation”). 
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Private governance approaches do not provide a silver bullet for this 
issue, but they provide new options. To the extent disagreements 
between developed and developing countries arise from underlying 
concerns about sovereignty, private initiatives may frame issues in 
ways that can reduce positional bargaining and enable efforts to focus 
on mitigation measures. For instance, market pressure from retail or 
other customers that induces an airline to become more efficient may 
provoke less resistance than pressure from a foreign government. In 
addition, private climate initiatives can subsidize emissions reductions 
in developing countries. Carbon offsets can play this role, but a high 
profile example of another approach has occurred in another sector: 
Apple’s support for the construction of power plants that will generate 
2 gigawatts of renewable power in China.198 This low-carbon power 
will enable Apple’s Chinese manufacturing operations to reduce their 
carbon footprint while subsidizing the transition to a lower-carbon 
electric grid in China.199 These types of private initiatives can be 
developed for the global civil aviation sector as well. They are unlikely 
to resolve debates over climate justice, but they can reduce carbon 
emissions in the near term despite the international gridlock. 
2. Closing the Efficiency Gap in Operations 
In addition to bypassing barriers that arise at the international level, 
private initiatives can bypass barriers that confront government efforts 
at all levels. For instance, although governments often hesitate to 
become involved in the day-to-day operations of firms,200 private 
initiatives are particularly promising regarding civil aviation because 
large cost savings can be achieved from carbon reduction efforts that 
target inefficiencies in firm operations. The Virgin Atlantic example 
suggests that a substantial efficiency gap may exist regarding fuel use, 
and the ability to root out these types of operating inefficiencies may 
provide firms in the sector with motivation to seek out carbon 
reduction opportunities. 
                                                                 
 198. VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 5, at ch. 8. 
 199. For a discussion, see VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 5, at ch. 8. As 
Gehring and Robb note “[i]t is within the context of this impasse in negotiations 
conducted through ICAO to date that the EU acted unilaterally.” GEHRNIG & ROBB, 
supra note 132, at 12. 
 200. An example in the U.S. is the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 
which was designed to avoid direct involvement in industrial production processes. 
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We might assume that corporate self-interest would have motivated 
Virgin Atlantic to take cost-effective fuel efficiency steps years ago,201 
yet the pilot fuel efficiency study highlights how private initiatives can 
accelerate the closing of the gap between the fuel economy steps that 
are in the firm’s interest and the firm’s actions.202 Even under the 
assumption that the market will eventually incorporate all efficiency 
gains that are in the firm’s interest, the Virgin Atlantic example 
demonstrates that major, highly profitable efficiency gains are often 
not achieved promptly. Virgin Atlantic began operating in 1984, yet it 
was not until 2014 that the airline identified a seemingly obvious, easy 
way to achieve many fuel cost reductions. A host of reasons could 
explain why an airline might not have addressed this principal-agent 
problem in the past (e.g., lack of information regarding fuel use, focus 
on other issues by management, separation of responsibilities among 
different units and employees within the firm, lack of expertise about 
or objections to behavioral interventions that include pilots, and 
others), but the Virgin Atlantic example demonstrates that pressure for 
carbon emissions reductions plus technical assistance from a non-
governmental organization can overcome the existing barriers.203 
Moreover, if Virgin Atlantic is in this position, many other airlines 
and other firms in the civil aviation sector may be as well. Private 
initiatives that combine pressure with expertise also might yield 
important emissions reductions from fuel and other inefficiencies in 
                                                                 
 201. Gosnell et al., supra note 1, at 1 (“fuel use in the industry affects profits—
fuel represents an average 33% of [airlines’] operating costs”). 
 202. For a brief overview of the debate between economists and engineers about 
the size of the efficiency gap, see Michael P. Vandenbergh, Keynote: Motivating 
Private Climate Governance: The Role of the Efficiency Gap, 70 ARKANSAS L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2018). 
 203. The efficiency gap in aviation may be driven by several factors, including 
inefficient operating practices. An example is the inattention to fuel use created by 
the principle–agent problem highlighted by the Virgin Atlantic study. Although the 
airline has an incentive to reduce fuel consumption, the actors in the best position to 
do so are the pilots. If the Virgin Atlantic experience is representative of other 
airlines, the pilots historically have not been given incentives to reduce fuel use, and 
until the firm felt pressure to reduce carbon emissions management did not focus on 
the opportunity to solve the principal-agent problem. Once pilot efficiency 
information and monitoring were in place, however, and pilot-level incentives were 
introduced, the research suggests that the pilots acted in ways that were more 
consistent with their airline principal’s preference for reduced fuel consumption, and 
large emissions reductions occurred. See generally Gosnell et al., supra note 1. 
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the civil aviation sector and from similar inefficiencies in other sectors. 
Studies show that carbon reduction motivations have led to cost 
savings in industries ranging from potato chip production to 
electronics to big box retail stores, and other transportation sectors 
(e.g., trucking) may be particularly promising targets of opportunity.204 
3. Accelerating the Development and Uptake of Efficient 
Technologies 
In addition to programs that target pilot behavior and other 
operational aspects of civil aviation firms, private initiatives can 
promote the development and uptake of more efficient technologies. 
As we discussed in Part I, new fuel-efficient airplane designs are being 
developed. A challenge for the civil aviation sector, however, is that 
the development and implementation of these new technologies is 
proceeding at a slow pace. 
Private initiatives can target both the development and uptake of 
new technologies through green finance and motivational efforts. 
Numerous green finance initiatives have emerged in the last decade 
that are designed to reduce the cost of developing and deploying 
efficient or low-carbon technologies.205 Aviation technologies that are 
not fully developed—like lighter and more efficient batteries that can 
facilitate electric aircraft, novel wing designs, and more—may be 
hindered by a lack of necessary investment in the underlying research. 
The development of more fuel-efficient aircraft may be a natural target 
for green finance initiatives. 
Green finance initiatives also could target the uptake of more 
efficient aircraft, reducing the cost of capital for airlines that accelerate 
fleet replacement. Even though new aircraft are already significantly 
more efficient than older models, the decades-long effective life of an 
aircraft means that absent additional incentives, fleet replacement will 
remain gradual. Similarly, a green bond fund could commit to 
investing in emerging aircraft biofuel technologies, or in the 
infrastructure needed to use biofuels on a large scale. 
                                                                 
 204. VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 5, at ch 5. 
 205. Charles Di Leva, Financing Climate Mitigation and Adaptation, 11 CARBON 
& CLIMATE L. REV. 314, 315-17 (2017) (describing a need to complement 
government investment with private sector capital). 
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In addition, private advocacy groups can call attention to airlines’ 
relative carbon emissions. In turn, private investor and lender 
initiatives can favor airlines that have taken steps to reduce carbon 
emissions and increase efficiency with aging fleets. In recent years, 
lending standards have emerged as an important way for banks to 
impose environmental requirements on borrowers for projects all 
around the world. For example, the Equator Principles are a collection 
of disclosure and environmental standards that ninety financial 
institutions in thirty-seven countries have voluntarily adopted.206 The 
effect of these standards is to impose environmental requirements on 
firms and projects that might otherwise be unaffected by national or 
international regulation.207 The Carbon Principles are another example 
of a private standard designed to address the carbon emissions 
associated with lending. The Principles foster enhanced climate 
diligence for new fossil-fuel power plants by requiring prospective 
borrowers to assess the financial viability of a proposed power plant in 
light of climate mitigation risks.208  In addition, the Principles call on 
banks to “[e]ncourage clients to pursue cost-effective energy 
efficiency, renewable energy and other low carbon alternatives to 
conventional generation.”209 The Equator Principles and Carbon 
Principles do not require that a less carbon intensive option be selected, 
but they require borrowers to identify carbon implications and to 
consider lower carbon alternatives. If applied to civil aviation, lending 
standards like these could increase airlines’ motivation to invest in 
                                                                 
 206. About the Equator Principles, EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, http://equator-
principles.com/about/ (last visited May. 5, 2017). 
 207. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 4, at 151–52. 
The Equator Principles require, for example, that “[f]or all Projects, in all locations, 
when . . . [e]missions are expected to be more than 100,000 tonnes of CO2 equivalent 
annually, an alternatives analysis will be conducted to evaluate less Greenhous Gas 
(GHG) intensive alternatives.” THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES 6 (2013), http://equator-
principles.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/equator_principles_III.pdf. 
 208. Leading Wall Street Banks Establish the Carbon Principles, CITIGROUP (Feb. 
4, 2008), http://www.citigroup.com/citi/news/2008/080204a.htm. Specifically, 
adherents to these principles agree to “[a]scertain and evaluate the financial and 
operational risk to fossil fuel generation financings posed by the prospect of domestic 
CO2 emissions controls,” and to “[u]se the results of this diligence as a contribution 
to the determination whether a transaction is eligible for financing and under what 
terms. THE CARBON PRINCIPLES 2 (2008), http://www.morganstanley.com/
globalcitizen/environment/CarbonPrinciplesFinal.pdf 
 209. THE CARBON PRINCIPLES supra note 209, at 2 
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technologies and infrastructure that will facilitate a more efficient 
industry and to take other steps to reduce carbon emissions. 
4. Increasing Overall Motivation for Climate Mitigation 
In addition to providing resources and motivation to achieve greater 
efficiency, private initiatives can create additional motivations for civil 
aviation firms to study and reduce their carbon footprints. Firms in the 
civil aviation sector are exposed to external and internal drivers for 
private governance, such as pressure from retail and corporate 
customers, employees, and others. By providing information to retail 
and corporate customers about the carbon footprint of air travel, 
private initiatives can allow these private actors to express preferences, 
even if they are weak preferences, for sustainable travel and can 
pressure airlines to compete over the carbon footprint of flights. 
Further, private naming-and-shaming and other reputation campaigns 
can induce airlines to avoid reputational risks by making efficiency 
investments and taking other steps to reduce their carbon footprints.210 
In some cases, information initiatives focus less on naming-and-
shaming campaigns than on providing factual information to affect 
decision-making by retail and corporate customers. For instance, 
informational initiatives can provide data on the carbon footprint of 
particular flights. Many large corporations have adopted carbon 
emissions targets and internal carbon taxes,211 so employees who are 
                                                                 
 210. Reputation campaigns can motivate climate mitigation actions that do not 
involve efficiency gains. Contrail reduction, for example, will not directly decrease 
an airline’s operating expense. But private reporting schemes that facilitate public 
awareness of those efforts can enhance the reputation of the firm, the value of which 
can offset bare cost increases encountered from contrail reduction measures. 
Although contrail mitigation does not have the same net-zero cost opportunities, the 
reputational effect on an airline of reducing emissions might be a net positive. 
Research in several corporate studies has demonstrated that firms often pursue costly 
climate mitigation steps that are likely to have positive reputational benefits. See 
Markus Kitzmueller & Jay Shimshack, Economic Perspectives on Corporate Social 
Responsibility 50 J. ECON LITERATURE 51 (2012) (reviewing economics literature on 
corporate sustainability behavior); Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 167 (“Even though 
consumer demand, as measured by willingness to pay for green goods, is often 
limited, firms also respond to more generalized concerns about firm or brand 
reputation.”). 
 211. Light, supra note 188, at 41 (“Microsoft’s internal carbon fee is a way for the 
firm to create incentives to reduce emissions, to force emitting business units or 
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booking corporate travel may have increasing incentives to opt for 
low-carbon flights.212 A number of companies are already increasing 
consumer access to information on the climate effects of individual 
and corporate travel decisions. Travel search engines Glooby and 
TripZero allow consumers to compare the carbon intensity of flight 
options while booking travel.213 TripZero charges hotels a commission 
to be searchable through the website, and it uses a portion of those 
commissions to purchase offsets against consumer travel.214 In 
                                                                 
divisions to acknowledge the “true cost” of using energy, and to raise money for its 
emissions-reduction efforts.”). 
 212. Examples of initiatives of this type in other fields include certification and 
carbon reporting schemes. The Marine Stewardship Council, for example, uses a 
third party auditing service to prove certifications to fisheries that are deemed 
sustainable. See Will Martin, Marine Stewardship Council: A Case Study in Private 
Environmental Standard-Setting, 44 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. LAW INST.) 10097, 
10097 (2014) (“The story of MSC’s development provides a case study of how 
private environmental standard-setters can make change happen, outside the context 
of laws and regulation.”). Products that come from these fisheries are able to 
advertise their sustainability with a recognizable label, which allows a consumer to 
use that sustainability information in making a decision about what to purchase 
without having to individually research each product. Products that come from these 
fisheries are able to advertise their sustainability with a recognizable label, which 
allows a consumer to use that sustainability information in making a decision about 
what to purchase without having to individually research each product. 
 213. GLOOBY, https://www.glooby.com/ (last visited June 11, 2018) (“Glooby is a 
travel search engine that enables users to find and compare prices on airplane tickets 
and hotels, while indicating the most fuel-efficient flights and eco-labeled hotels. We 
search among a variety of travel agencies, airlines and booking sites and show you 
all the information you need to make better travel decisions.”); TRIPZERO, 
https://www.tripzero.com/ (last visited June 11, 2018) (“At TripZero we believe it’s 
our responsibility to protect the planet. So we’ve created a different kind of travel 
agency. When you book your hotel with us, we offset the carbon footprint created 
by your trip—at no charge to you.”). Similar initiatives exist for hotel bookings as 
well. See, e.g., Easily book a green hotel, BOOKDIFFERENT, https://web.archive.org/
web/20170110015310/https://www.bookdifferent.com/en/page/green-hotels/ 
[https://perma.cc/6X87-QHK8] (last visited June 11, 2018) (“By offering an easy 
way to choose a green hotel we hope to increase the number of eco-friendly travelers. 
Having more travelers that look for sustainable options will also work as an incentive 
for other hotels to go green too.”). 
 214. Marc Gunther, TripZero: A lean startup tries to ‘green’ the travel industry, 
THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 15, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-
business/tripzero-startup-green-travel-industry [https://perma.cc/T27B-YT6A] 
(“[H]otels pay commissions to TripZero for attracting customers. A portion of the 
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calculating the emissions generated by a given flight, Glooby takes 
into account key efficiency factors such as the type of aircraft 
operating on a given route, as well as the seating density on that 
particular flight.215 Some individual airlines are making carbon 
emissions information available to retail consumers as well. Air New 
Zealand, for example, automatically displays the cost of offsetting a 
flight when a customer books online and gives the customer the option 
of paying for the offset.216 
5. Addressing Demand Growth 
Government efforts to regulate civil aviation are particularly 
difficult because the growing demand for civil aviation is putting and 
will continue to put great pressure on the ability of the sector to meet 
even modest climate targets. Public and private efforts to lower civil 
aviation emissions will buy time, but unless civil aviation can adopt 
carbon neutral practices by the second half of this century, demand 
growth will continue to undermine emissions reduction efforts. Not 
only is demand projected to increase sharply, but the principal 
international governmental body that is charged with reducing civil 
aviation carbon emissions, the ICAO, arguably has a mandate to 
promote the growth of the civil aviation industry, a mandate that is in 
competition with, if not superior to, its mandate to reduce carbon 
emissions.217 
                                                                 
commissions is then deployed to buy carbon offsets, for such projects as the largest 
native-species reforestation campaign in Chile’s history, a forest protection project 
in Kenya, wind turbines for Indiana schools and a methane capture project on a 
Pennsylvania dairy farm. The offsets are certified by reputable third parties, 
including the Verified Carbon Standard . . . .”). 
 215. Michele Herrmann, How To Book Flights Like An Eco-Traveler, EPICURE & 
CULTURE (Mar. 1, 2016), https://epicureandculture.com/green-travel-glooby/ 
[https://perma.cc/7Q3E-54K5] (“With its search results, Glooby calculates certain 
factors relating to emission levels for flights, including fuel consumption per aircraft, 
number of seats, and cabin class.”) 
 216. Customer carbon offset programme, Air New Zealand, https://www.
airnewzealand.com/sustainability-customer-carbon-offset [https://perma.cc/SS3N-
4PTN] (“When booking online, the carbon emissions for your flight(s) and the cost 
to offset them is automatically calculated and displayed. If you decide to offset, the 
cost of emission units will be added to the total paid for the flight(s).”) 
 217. See GEHRING & ROBB, supra note 132, at n.106 (noting that Resolution 
A36/22 asks Member States to “refrain from environmental measures that would 
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Private initiatives are not a silver bullet for the challenge posed by 
increasing demand, but they provide new ways to think about the issue. 
Private initiatives regarding demand reduction may be perceived as 
less intrusive and threatening than government initiatives on the topic. 
Several examples already exist. For instance, corporate carbon 
commitments that include emissions associated with employee travel 
are likely to lead companies to reduce travel when possible. Video 
conferencing can reduce the need for travel. Standardization and other 
developments in video conferencing equipment and software could 
reduce the risk of technical glitches that discourage video 
conferencing. Public information campaigns by NGOs could attach 
reputational consequences to firms’ decisions to hold conferences or 
meetings that require excessive air travel. Similarly, corporate carbon 
policies and supply-chain contracts can lessen demand as well by 
creating incentives not to use forms of expedited shipping that require 
use of aircraft. Of course, private initiatives also rely on the ability to 
induce for-profit firms to participate, and it may be hard to tackle 
demand issues absent the coercion and resources of government. 
6. Addressing Actors Beyond the Civil Aviation Sector 
In addition to airlines, other actors play important roles in civil 
aviation carbon emissions but are hard to reach through public 
governance. For instance, many airports operate without meaningful 
competition, and consequently lack strong incentives to express 
consumers’ preferences for efficiency and climate mitigation. A recent 
International Air Transport Association report examined competition 
among airports and found although internet resources give consumers 
an unprecedented ability to compare travel options, most still have a 
strong preference for traveling from their local airport.218 This 
highlights the fact that even where a majority of consumers have a 
preference for an airport with reduced carbon emissions, the strong 
                                                                 
adversely affect the orderly and sustainable development of international civil 
aviation.”). Gehring and Robb observe that “ICAO has been accused of serving ‘as 
much, if not more, as a forum for championing causes to preclude the sector from 
mandatory measures aimed at reducing [greenhouse gas] emissions as it has for 
developing such measures.’” Id. at n.107. 
 218. JAMES WILTSHIRE, INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION, AIRPORT 
COMPETITION: MYTH OR REALITY? 12 (2017), https://www.iata.org/publications/
economics/Reports/airport_competition_web_2017.pdf. 
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competitive position that many airports enjoy may undercut their 
managers’ motivations to reduce carbon emissions.219 Advocacy 
groups may need to turn to other sources of motivation, such as 
bondholders, airlines, and corporate travel to induce airport authorities 
to place a higher priority on carbon emissions reductions. 
An example of an opportunity for private initiatives is that financing 
for airports can include requirements that facilities be constructed in a 
way that allows for blended wing body design or strut braced wing 
aircraft to obtain necessary ground services. Similarly, biofuel use 
could be increased if lending standards required airports to make 
alternative fuels available. An example of a recent effort regarding 
biofuels is the Carbon War Room’s work to facilitate long-term 
investment in sustainable aviation fuels at Seattle-Tacoma 
International Airport (“Sea-Tac”).220 In a 2017 report, the Carbon War 
Room investigated long-term funding opportunities that would enable 
Sea-Tac to increase access to sustainable aviation fuels.221 Reports of 
this type provide expertise about the infrastructure needed to support 
alternative fuels and can increase confidence that a prospective bio fuel 
project will find a market for its fuel. 
Although we have identified a number of potential initiatives and 
actors, our treatment of the private governance option for civil aviation 
is not intended to be comprehensive. Many other initiatives and actors 
could play a role in reducing civil aviation’s emissions. In addition, the 
analytic framework we have used in this paper could be applied to 
other transportation sectors. Comparable initiatives and actors in the 
context of shipping, for example, suggest comparable opportunities for 
prompt, inexpensive climate mitigation even in the absence of 
                                                                 
 219. See id. at 5 (“Regulators and policy makers need to be careful not to rely on 
airline competition masking the lack of effective competition between airports and 
the absence of strong commercial imperatives on airport operators to deliver a good 
outcome for consumers and other airport users in terms of price and service 
quality.”). 
 220. ROCKY MOUNTAIN INSTITUTE, Innovative Funding for Sustainable Aviation 
Fuel at U.S. Airports: Explored at Seattle-Tacoma International, https://www.rmi.
org/insights/reports/innovative-funding-sea-tac-2017/ [https://perma.cc/433U-
N8XX]. 
 221. ROCKY MOUNTAIN INSTITUTE-CARBON WAR ROOM & SKYNRG, 
INNOVATIVE FUNDING FOR SUSTAINABLE AVIATION AT US. AIRPORTS (2017), 
https://www.rmi.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/07/RMI_Sustainable_Aviation_
Innovative_Funding_SAF_2017.pdf 
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traditional governance at the international, national, or subnational 
levels. 
CONCLUSION 
Civil aviation is becoming an increasingly large part of the total 
human influence on the atmosphere. Aviation’s effects on the climate 
are increasingly well understood, as are the methods through which 
these effects could be mitigated. Much of the industry is international 
and its effects are widely dispersed both through time and 
geographically, however, and traditional public governance 
mechanisms may be inadequate to the challenging task of reducing the 
carbon emissions from civil aviation. Without intervention of some 
kind, the industry is not on track to play its part in meeting the Paris 
Agreement’s climate goals. 
Private environmental governance initiatives can complement 
existing government efforts and play a direct role in addressing this 
problem. Opportunities exist in part because the industry has not 
incorporated major existing efficiency opportunities, and absent new 
private efforts civil aviation firms lack the motivation and coordinating 
ability to take advantage of opportunities on the horizon. A private 
climate governance agenda for civil aviation could include the types 
of initiatives described here, plus others developed by experts in the 
field. The agenda could yield prompt, substantial carbon emissions 
reductions from the civil aviation sector and could complement more 
comprehensive government action when it occurs. 
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APPENDIX A: CARBON EMISSIONS BY COUNTRY222 
2015 total 
emissions country 
rank Country 
2015 total carbon dioxide emissions 
from fuel combustion (million metric 
tons) 
2015 per capita carbon 
dioxide emissions from fuel 
combustion (metric tons) 
1 China 9040.74 6.59 
2 United States 4997.50 15.53 
3 India 2066.01 1.58 
4 Russia 1468.99 10.19 
5 Japan 1141.58 8.99 
6 Germany 729.77 8.93 
7 South Korea 585.99 11.58 
8 Iran 552.40 6.98 
9 Canada 549.23 15.32 
10 Saudi Arabia 531.46 16.85 
11 Brazil 450.79 2.17 
12 Mexico 442.31 3.66 
13 Indonesia 441.91 1.72 
14 South Africa 427.57 7.77 
15 United Kingdom 389.75 5.99 
16 Australia 380.93 15.83 
17 Italy 330.75 5.45 
18 Turkey 317.22 4.10 
19 France 290.49 4.37 
20 Poland 282.40 7.34 
 
 
                                                                 
 222. Each Country’s Share of CO2 Emissions, supra note 25. 
